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Abstract
This article explores the spectacular prevalence, and failure, of the single most
common technique for protecting personal autonomy in modern society:
mandated disclosure. The article has four sections:
(1) A comprehensive summary of the recurring use of mandated disclosures, in
many forms and circumstances, in the areas of consumer and borrower
protection, patient informed consent, contract formation, and constitutional
rights;
(2) A survey of the empirical literature documenting the failure of the mandated
disclosure regime in informing people and in improving their decisions;
(3) An account of the multitude of reasons mandated disclosures fail, focusing
on the political dynamics underlying the enactments of these mandates, the
incentives of disclosers to carry them out, and, most importantly, on the
ability of disclosees to use them;
(4) An argument that mandated disclosure not only fails to achieve its stated goal
but also leads to unintended consequences that often harm the very people it
intends to serve.
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INTRODUCTION
A. The Argument
A key regulatory technique is much used but little remarked – “mandated disclosure.” It
aspires to improve complex decisions people make in their economic and social relationships and
particularly to protect the naïve in dealing with the sophisticated. The technique is to require “the
discloser” to give “the disclosee” information to use to make better decisions, and particularly to
keep the discloser from abusing its superior position.
For example: You are shopping for a loan. Or you are told you need prostate-cancer
surgery. Or you are buying a computer on-line. Or you are under arrest and under questioning.
You’ve never faced your choice before. It turns on facts and practices you don’t know. The
mortgagee, the doctor, the vendor, and the police are experienced and have interests of their
own.
Mandated disclosure is supposed to give you information with which to analyze your
choices carefully and to choose optimally. Thus truth-in-lending laws require your lender to
highlight credit terms. The law of informed consent requires your doctor to describe
prostatectomies, radiation, chemotherapy, and watchful waiting. Contract doctrine requires your
vendor to tell you your contract’s terms, like warranties and mandatory arbitration. Miranda
requires the police to tell you your rights. Thus informed, you understand your choices well
enough to make an intelligent decision about your mortgage, your cancer, your computer, or
your confession.
Mandated disclosure is everywhere. Numberless federal and state statutes, administrative
regulations, and court rulings stipulate (sometimes marvelously elaborate) disclosure
requirements: businesses that issue car, student, or automobile loans; mortgagees; home-equity
lenders; credit-card companies; banks accepting deposits; mutual funds; securities brokers;
credit-reporting agencies; investment advisors; ATM operators; pawnshops; payday lenders;
rent-to-own dealers; installment-sales vendors; insurers of lives, property, health, cars, rented
vehicles, self-storage facilities, and much else; car-towing companies; car-repair shops; motor
clubs; residential real-estate agencies, developers, and landlords; time-share programs, sellers
and lessors of mobile homes; membership camping facilities; providers of home improvements,
services, and repairs; home-alarm installers; vocational schools; traffic-violator schools; agents
selling electricity; immigration consultants; dog breeders and sellers; travel services and travel
agencies; art dealers; police; doctors; hospitals; managed-care organizations; colleges and
universities; restaurants and other food establishments; halal food dealers; and endlessly more.
To say nothing, for example, of the common law obligation to disclose information prior to a
contract; or of the federal and state campaign finance regulation, recently trimmed to not much
more than mandated disclosure.
Mandated disclosure addresses a real problem: Modernity showers us with consequential
and complex decisions about which we know little. Unsophisticated people must work with,
depend on, and contend with specialized people and enterprises that routinely handle and become
expert in complex transactions. People must make decisions about financial matters of many

3
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art9

4

Ben-Shahar and Schneider:

kinds. They face medical choices. They buy things whose working they don’t understand and
whose quality they cannot evaluate under terms they do not know.
Not only does mandated disclosure address a real problem – it rests on a plausible
assumption: that in making decisions, more information is better than less. More information
helps people make better decisions, thus bolstering their autonomy. Since people can no longer
customize most transactions (since their menu contains a few non-negotiable bundles of
attributes) disclosing helps restore some individual control. It may also induce enterprises to
behave more efficiently.
Although mandated disclosure addresses a real problem and rests on a plausible
assumption, it chronically fails to accomplish its purpose, as empirical evidence about many
mandates shows. Even where mandated disclosure seems to succeed, its costs in money, effort,
and time generally swamp its benefits. And mandated disclosure has unintended and undesirable
consequences, including driving out better regulation and hurting the people it is supposed to
help.
Not only does the empirical evidence show that mandated disclosure regularly fails,
failure is inherent in the technique. First, mandated disclosure rests on false assumptions about
how people live, think, and make decisions. Second, it rests on false assumptions about the
decisions it intends to improve. Third, its success requires an impossibly long series of unlikely
achievements by law-makers, disclosers, and disclosees. That is, the prerequisites of successful
mandated disclosure are so numerous and so onerous that they are rarely met.
Because the mandated-disclosure mantra – more information is better than less – sounds
plausible, we must be clear about our topic and our argument. We are not asking what
information people need to make good decisions. We are asking whether a regulatory technique
– mandated disclosure – works. We are not saying that information never helps people make
decisions. Our argument is directed at a regulatory technique in which a law-maker requires a
“discloser” to give a “disclosee” a standard disclosure—pre-packaged information the law-maker
thinks the disclosee needs to choose wisely.
Our tasks, then, are to identify mandated disclosure as a distinctive regulatory method, to
suggest the breadth of its use, to review the evidence of its failure, and to explain why it fails.
Our task is not to propose an alternative. Mandated disclosure has been used so extensively –
one might say so indiscriminately – that it is asked to solve many kinds of problems in many
kinds of areas. We doubt that any single regulatory method can be so widely effective. We
believe that commentators and law-makers must instead undertake the burdensome and
politically painful work of tailoring solutions to problems. We close by suggesting some paths
toward this harder but more rewarding work.
B. The Method
Our argument has four steps. The first is to identify mandated disclosure as a distinctive
regulatory technique. The second is to show how extensive and intensive mandated disclosure
is. For both these purposes, we searched for statutes that mandate disclosures in three states
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(California, Michigan, and Illinois) and located several hundred of them. Less systematically,
we looked for Federal statutes, administrative regulations, and case law that mandate disclosures.
In Part I we give abundant examples of the many sectors in which disclosure is mandated, the
kinds of information that must be disclosed, and the format that disclosure takes.
The third step is to ask whether these mandates work. They are used in so many
unrelated fields that we cannot assess them ourselves. Instead, we survey the empirical literature.
The gravamen of that literature is that mandated disclosure generally fails to achieve its goals.
The fourth step, perhaps the most substantial one, is to explain that failure. We canvass
the systematic factors that keep law-makers, disclosers, and disclosees from accomplishing all
the things they would have to do to make mandated disclosure work reliably.
C. The Style
Writing about mandated disclosure raises the same problem mandating disclosure does:
The amount of information exceeds the discloser’s ability to describe it intelligibly and the
disclosee’s ability to understand it usefully. To survey the spectacular profusion of mandated
disclosure would require marching through acres of statutes, regulations, and cases and to make
the same mistake lawmakers make – pointlessly burdening our audience. In sanity’s name, we
have eliminated data that are more disruptive than helpful, especially the footnotes that cite
statutes, regulations, and cases that mandate disclosure. The skeptical or curious may consult an
on-line version of the article replete with citations.1
In like manner, we urge readers to read only what they need. In particular, parts I and II,
which catalog information, need be scrutinized only by the skeptical. If you accept what is
quickly obvious – that mandated disclosure is pervasive – you can skim Part I. If you accept
what is less obvious but richly documented – that this device has been largely ineffective – you
can skim Part II. You can then concentrate on Parts III and IV, which not only do much of the
article’s analytic work but also provide yet further evidence of the pervasiveness and the
ineffectiveness of mandated disclosure.

I. THE “DISCLOSURE EMPIRE”: THE PERVASIVENESS OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE
Mandated disclosure is now a standard weapon in the arsenals of legislatures, courts,
administrative agencies, and commentators. In this Part, we describe several paradigmatic
examples of mandated disclosure to show just how standard the weapon has become, and survey
the entire landscape of the mandatory disclosure device.
A. Three Paradigmatic Examples of Mandated Disclosure
1. The Terms of Credit
1

DISCLAIMER: DESPITE THE REPRESENTATION ABOVE, THE PRESENT DRAFT DOES
INCLUDE ALL THE FOOTNOTES.
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Selecting terms on which to borrow money exemplifies the kind of decisions mandated
disclosure seeks to improve – unfamiliar, complex, and consequential. Lenders have information
relevant to the decision but may have reasons not to educate borrowers. Law-makers have
deployed truth-in-lending laws to compel lenders to inform borrowers, generally in considerable
detail.
For example, the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 (TILA), as implemented by Regulation Z,
and many state laws make lenders disclose interest rates and fees.2 Sometimes these statutes
specify metrics intended to summarize complex credit obligations; sometimes they specify
disclosure phrases, like options to prepay, minimum payments, and much more.3 For example,
try to decipher this Illinois “mini”-TILA (which is typical of statutes that require disclosing a
specific statement:
(m) … Unearned finance charges under the Rule of 78ths are computed by
calculating for all fully unexpired monthly installment periods, as originally
scheduled or deferred, which follow the day of prepayment, the portion of the
precomputed interest that bears the same ratio to the total precomputed interest
as the balances scheduled to be outstanding during that monthly installment
period bear to the sum of all scheduled monthly outstanding balances originally
contracted for.4
TILA was a prototype consumer-protection statute and became the template for most
consumer-credit legislation,5 legislation which now mandates detailed disclosures for credit
generally, credit cards, automobile loans, student loans, mortgages, and other home-secured
loans.6 Credit-card issuers, for example, must disclose all a contract’s terms and highlight in a
uniform way critical terms like APRs and fees.7
Attempts to protect poor borrowers often recruit disclosure requirements. Pawnshops—a
primary financial resource for the vulnerable—must detail interest payments, redemption
options, fees and charges, and statutory caps.8 Payday lenders must tell borrowers that their
loans will not solve their long-term problems, that other debt-management services may be
2

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.; Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R § 226; see also USCA § 4302 (disclosure in loan
solicitations and documents of terms, interest, fees, penalties, etc.) The most important disclosure in
TILAs is the APR—a uniform measure of the cost of credit. See Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90321, § 107, 82 Stat. 146, 149 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (LexisNexis 2008) (defining the APR); Truth in
Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 121-31, 82 Stat. 146, 152-57 (1968), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-49
(LexisNexis 2008) (requiring disclosure of the APR).
3
Michigan MCLS § 390.1222 (2008) (payment, penalties and options for educational loans).
4
205 ILCS 670/16: Disclosure of Terms of Contract.
5
Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80
Georgetown L. J. 233, 234 (1991).
6
Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. § 213. See also Press Release, Federal Reserve (Sept. 27, 1996), online at
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/boardacts/1996/19960927/default.htm.
7
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1748.11(a), 1748.13(a) (2007) (disclosure by creditors of the terms of the credit card
account during enrollment; and disclosure on each billing statement of the effects of making less than full
payment).
8
Pawnbroker Regulation Act, 205 ILCS 510/2 (pawnbrokers disclosures in Illinois).
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available, and that they cannot be criminally prosecuted to collect the loan.9 Rent-to-own dealers
must reveal the “true” cost of changing a rental to a purchase and of other fees.10 Retail
installment sales must be accompanied by information about many financial aspects of the
transaction.11
Disclosure requirements dominate regulation of another kind of credit – mortgages,
including high-risk mortgages.12 Mortgage disclosure acts require written statements about:
obligations to obtain mortgage insurance,13 “all material facts” in mortgage-brokerage
agreements;14 borrowers’ rights to renounce obligations after entering mortgage-rescue
services;15 lender’s obligations to disclose changes in loan terms;16 and more. Lenders must
even say that defaulting can lead to foreclosure and that it is prudent to shop for low rates.17
2. Informed Consent
Patients often face unfamiliar but vital choices, which depend upon complex factors
about which they understand little. Doctors understand these choices better but may lack the
time, interest, inclination, or ingenuity to educate the patient. So that patients may make their
own medical decisions, doctors must tell them the advantages and disadvantages of their
choices.18 Few disclosure mandates have been as richly favored as this doctrine of informed
consent. Courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies have mandated it in many forms and
fora for many decades. The medical and research establishments have made it their conventional
wisdom, with barely a whisper of dissent.
Informed consent can require extensive disclosures. Ailments and treatments are
innumerable, and doctors are told to give patients all the information a reasonable person would
9

Payday Loan Reform Act, 815 ILCS 122/2-20 (disclosures in English and Spanish by payday lenders).
Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.623 (2007); Michigan MCLS § 445.953 (2008) (“rental-purchase” agreements).
11
Michigan MCLS § 445.853 (2008) (disclosure in retail installment sale of overall price, the feeds,
insurance, remaining balance, time-price differentials, and more); Ill. Admin. Code Tit. 14, §475.610
(disclosure in credit sale advertising); Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act, 815 ILCS 375/2.9
(1967) (disclosure in installment sales of cars).
12
High Risk Home Loan Act, 815 ILCS 137/95 (2004) (Disclosure to borrower that “YOU MIGHT BE
ABLE TO OBTAIN A LOAN AT A LOWER COST … CLOSING COSTS AND FEES VARY BASED
ON MANY FACTORS … YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME AND ANY MONEY YOU PUT INTO
IT IF YOU DO NOT MEET YOUR PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LOAN…”).
13
Mortgage Insurance Limitation and Notification Act, 765 ILCS 930/15 (disclosure of requirement to
obtain insurance).
14
Residential Mortgage License Act, 205 ILCS 635/5-7(a)(3) (Illinois statute requiring disclosures by
mortgage brokers of “all material facts” that might affect the borrower).
15
Mortgage Rescue Fraud Act, 765 ILCS 940/10 (2007) (disclosure by “distressed property consultants”
of the rights of clients to cancel and to delay payments).
16
205 ILCS 636/5-9 (any material change in loan terms have to be disclosed timely).
17
Michigan MCLS § 445.1637 (2007) (pre-mortgage educational disclosures); Cal. Civ. Code § 2971
(2007) (disclosure that a home equity loan is secured by the home and “failure to repay the loan for any
reason could cause you to lose your home.”).
18
Two classic cases are Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F2d 772 (DC Cir 1972), and Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P2d
1 (Calif 1972). A legislative example is Georgia Code Annotated § 31-9-6.1.
10
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want in making the decision. This formulation has been understood increasingly broadly. For
example, “[c]ourts are becoming more receptive to including physician-specific and financial
information within the scope of informed consent.” 19
We will pay particular attention to disclosure of conflicts of interest. In one muchnoticed case, the court held “that a physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for a medical
procedure must . . . disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research
or economic, that may affect his medical judgment.”20 And one court extended the principle by
holding that doctors may be obliged to tell patients about their competence to perform
procedures and the superior competence of other doctors.21
In addition, states “have enacted limited expansions of informed consent duties, generally
in response to focused advocacy by patient groups.”22 Such mandates are often intended more to
persuade than to inform. For example, more than a third of the states specify information doctors
must give patients about treating breast cancer with lumpectomies.23 Some states tell doctors
what to tell women seeking abortions. For example, Planned Parenthood of Eastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, found constitutional provisions of 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 3205 (1990),
which required doctors to tell women
the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and
the “probable gestational age of the unborn child.” The physician . . . must
inform the woman of the availability of printed materials published by the State
describing the fetus and providing information about medical assistance for
childbirth, information about child support from the father, and a list of agencies
which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion.24
Informed consent reaches its acme – or nadir – in the IRB system. No researcher at an
institution receiving federal funds who interacts with or collects “private” information about a
human being may proceed without the approval of an “Institutional Review Board” that (among
other things) must ratify the language in which the consent of research subjects is sought.25
3. Contract Boilerplate

19

Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Disclosing Physician Financial Incentives, 281 JAMA 1424,
1426 (1999). For example, one “court ruled that payments received from a pharmaceutical manufacturer
to prescribe a particular medication were within a physician's informed consent obligation.” Ibid.
20
Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990).
21
Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 NW2d 495 (Wisc 1996).
22
William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99
Columbia L Rev 1701 (1999).
23
Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85
Iowa L Rev 261 (1999).
24
505 US 833 (1992).
25
See generally 45 CFR 46.
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Truth-in-lending acts and informed-consent doctrine concern specific transactions. The
common law, however, has long required contracting party to make disclosures.26 Recently,
much attention has been given to a particular set of contract disclosures – the fine print of
contracts. Many terms of many consumer transactions are drafted by businesses and tucked
away in the package (“shrinkwraps”), or displayed online with an “I Agree” button
(“clickwraps”), or printed on the back of order forms. These terms usually treat contingent
contractual rights – like warranties, dispute resolution, and remedies. Because this obscurely
written and placed boilerplate may conceal unanticipated and tricky traps, legislators, courts, and
commentators have devised disclosure requirements. In response to several court decisions
holding these standard forms binding even if not disclosed prior to the transaction,27 reform has
been percolating. For example, the ALI’s proposed Principles of the Law of Software
Contracting exclude such terms from the contract if there is no opportunity to read before a
purchase.28 The rationale is typical: to protect the autonomy of consumers.29 Similarly, the
European Draft Common Frame of Reference (a proposed EC commercial code) deals with the
“consumer at a significant informational disadvantage” by mandating disclosures.30
The “opportunity to read” principle also appears in specific contexts. For example, the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and UCC Section 2-316 both require a warranty disclaimer to be
“conspicuously” disclosed in “simple and readily understood language.”31 Similar state laws
apply to issues like mandatory arbitration,32 risk warnings, and disclosure of modifications of the
contract.33 The familiar ALLCAPS font in consumer contracts is the artifact of such
requirements.
The doctrine of unconscionability also generates contract disclosure requirements.
Undisclosed terms can be procedurally unconscionable, especially if they conflict with
consumers’ reasonable expectations.34 A clause waiving liability for negligence – if not illegal
per se – must be clearly and conspicuously printed or explicitly pointed out.35
B. Other Provinces in the Disclosure Empire

26

For an illuminating discussion of the general contract law disclosure doctrine, see Richard Craswell,
Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract and Law and Elsewhere,
92 Virg. L.Rev. 565 (2006).
27
ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.
1997).
28
The American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, Discussion Draft (March 30,
2007) §§ 2.01(c)(1), 2.02(c)(2).
29
ALI Principles, Reporter’s note Promoting Reading and the Opportunity to Read Terms, at 130-131.
30
Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference
(2008) (hereinafter ‘DCFR’) §§ II.-3:103, 3:105.
31
15 U.C.S.A. § 2302; Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-316, 2-719.
32
E.g., Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 1363.1 (2008) (disclosure of mandatory arbitration in health plan
contracts).
33
205 ILCS 635/5-9 (disclosure of any material change in terms of loan).
34
Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60
U. Chi. L.Rev. 1, 55-60 (1993).
35
Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L Rev 478, 522-523 (1980-1981).
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1. Financial Transactions
Numerous statutes apply TILA-like rules to other financial accounts: depository, savings,
mutual funds, etc.36 These disclosures are sometimes comprehensive, as in TILA or the Good
Faith Estimates in mortgage disclosures, which include numerous items. Other times, the
disclosures are “segregated”—statutes that mandate disclosure of a particular item in a separate
form, in attempt to highlight its presence. For example, recently the Fed promulgated a new
regulation to address the problem of high overdraft fees on ATM and Debit withdrawal.37 The
regulation did not mandate the actual fees banks charge. It only required that consumers be
allowed to opt in to the scheme, by receiving a disclosure notice on a separate form and signing a
separate dotted line.
Financial disclosures stretch to every domain of consumer protection. Businesses
planning to use clients’ financial information must tell them of their right to opt out and explain,
in fine print, how to.38 Financial brokers must disclose their experience, obligations, and fees and
even warn clients that the State does not recommend using their services.39 Investment advisers
must confess a catalog of past misdeeds, including rule violations and disciplinary actions.40
Credit-reporting agencies must tell consumers their federal and state rights.41 Creditors bundling
credit insurance with a loan must tell customers whether the insurance is required by law and that
it might be duplicative.42 ATM operators must warn customers not to use ATMs at night, alone,
or in perilous circumstances.43
A classic instance of mandated disclosure is the congeries of securities laws and
regulations. These are significantly intended for and used by experts and thus fall outside our
scope. However, they also govern sales to the laity, and some of their provisions are specifically
intended to help amateurs.
2. Insurance

36

Banks must disclose information to depositors when they open accounts or request some transactions.
See Cal. Fin. Code § 23035(d)(2008); Consumer Deposit Account Act, 205 ILCS 605/3 (Illinois financial
institution disclosures of consumer deposit accounts terms). The Truth in Savings Act – as implemented
by Regulation DD – tells depository institutions what costs and terms they must reveal and how. See 12
U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq.; Regulation DD, 12 C.F.R. § 230 (2000). SEC regulations require disclosing
mutual fund fees. See Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management
Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8393, 34-49333, IC-26372, File No. S7-51-02, 17
C.F.R. §§ 210, 239, 249, 270, & 274; RIN 3235-AG64, 2004 SEC LEXIS 474 (Feb. 27, 2004).
37
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20091112a1.pdf.
38
Michigan MCLS § 500.519, 529, 543 (2008) (disclosure of consumers’ right to opt out of the transfer
of their private information to third parties).
39
Illinois Loan Brokers Act, 815 ILCS 175/15-30 (Illinois 1995) (disclosures required by loan brokers).
40
Ill. Admins. Code. Tit. 14, § 130.847 (Financial and Disciplinary Information that investment advisers
must disclose to clients).
41
Fair Credit Reporting Act § 608(c)(2).
42
Cal Ins. Code § 1758.97 (2007) (disclosure by credit insurance agents).
43
Automated Teller Machine Security Act, 205 ILCS 695/15.
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Insurance transactions require complex calculations about cloudy contingencies.
Insurance buyers cannot easily tell the value of their purchase, since it depends on actuarial
estimates they do not know and cannot analyze. Nor can the quality of the insurance be
ascertained until a loss materializes, when it’s too late to switch to a better product. These
burdens are compounded when insurance is bundled with financial investment (as in life
insurance or mortgage-related insurance products). So lawmakers try to protect the bewildered.
Some protection involves regulatory oversight, such as precertification of the
standardized insurance policy, but much of it comes from a mosaic of disclosure statutes. Often
insurers must not only state policy terms, they also must highlight terms that are especially
important or that might cause unexpected agonies. So fees separate from the policy premiums
must be disclosed.44 Insurance financing acts require disclosure of the ways premiums can be
paid.45 Insurance products with investment risks must reveal them.46 Residential property
insurance acts require a reminder that rebuilding costs may differ from market value.47 Some
legislators have drafted a residential-property insureds’ “bills of rights” which, too, must be
disclosed.48 And since disclosure requirements are supposed to deter people from buying
unneeded insurance, consumers must be reminded that they need not buy insurance that is
bundled with another service, like car-rental/auto-insurance49 or self-storage/propertyinsurance.50
Life insurance proliferates opportunities to make bad decisions. For example, people
sometimes regret assigning insurance benefits. Their right to change their minds must be
disclosed.51 Similarly, a statute might require a viatical settlement provider to tell the viator
about alternatives like accelerated benefits from the life insurer; to state all the adverse
consequences of the settlement, like tax, creditor rights, and loss of Medicaid rights; and to
explain all the other benefits forfeited.52
3. Health Care
Informed consent is only the beginning of disclosure requirements in health law. For
example, because Congress believed advance directives were insufficiently used, the Patient
Self-Determination Act (PSDA) requires hospitals, nursing facilities, home health agencies,
44

215 ILCS 5/500-80 (disclosure of insurance commissions).
Cal. Ins. Code § 778(4)(a)(2007) (disclosure by insurance broker-agent of finance and repayment
obligations relating to fire and casualty insurance premiums); 215 ILCS 5/513a9 (disclosures in premium
financing and premium insurance agreements).
46
Cal. Ins. Code § 762 (2007) (disclosure by seller of the risks involved in the investment) 215 ILCS
5/1409 (disclosure when the advertised insurance product involves investment risk).
47
Cal. Ins. Code §§ 10101, 10102(a) (2008) (disclosures in residential property insurance).
48
Cal. Ins. Code §10103.5 (2007) (disclosures and explanations the “Bill of Rights” must contain).
49
Cal. Ins. Code § 1758.86 (2007) (disclose that insurance is not mandatory and may already be provided
by other sources); 215 ILCS 5/500-105 and 625 ILCS 27/20 (Illinois statute, same).
50
215 ILCS 5/500-107 (disclosure by storage facility that coverage may be duplicate).
51
Michigan MCL § 500.2080 (2008) (right of insured to revoke assignment of life insurance proceeds to
cemetery or funeral services).
52
215 ILCS 158/35. In a viatical settlement, terminally ill insureds sell their death benefits in exchange
for annuities or other immediate support payments.
45
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hospices, and managed care organizations to give patients “written information . . . concerning –
(i) an individual's rights under State law . . . to make decisions concerning . . . medical care,
including the right to . . . refuse . . . treatment and the right to formulate advance directives, and
(ii) the written policies of the provider . . . respecting the implementation of such rights . . . .”53
Because HHS believed patients’ privacy was endangered, HIPAA elaborately requires
institutions to tell patients their privacy rules. Because conflicts of interest are widely feared,
health-care services must disclose their use of “financial bonuses in referrals or allocation of
services.54
Another bounteous fount of mandated disclosure is a program both employers and the
government have recently promoted: “consumer-directed health-care.” It gives consumers an
economic stake in choosing their health-care plan; their doctors, hospitals, and other providers;
and tests and treatments.55 As the former HHS secretary said, “We have a better option, to
provide beneficiaries with reliable information about the cost and quality of their care. When
given that kind of information, we know that consumers will make decisions that drive costs
down and the quality up.”56 This program will work only if patients are informed about the costs
and quality of all that they buy, and so disclosures have both been directly mandated and
indirectly necessitated.
4. Miranda Warnings
The Supreme Court famously enforced the Fifth Amendment by mandating disclosures.
“[T]he person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he or she has the
right to remain silent, and that anything the person says may be used against that person in court;
the person must be clearly informed that he or she has the right to consult with an attorney and to
have that attorney present during questioning, and that, if he or she is indigent, an attorney will
be provided at no cost to represent him or her.”57 Many jurisdictions try to make the disclosure
“meaningful” by requiring, for example, that it be in a language the suspect understands, that the
suspect be asked whether he understood the warning, and that the suspect be told of his right to
end questioning.
5. Goods and Services
Many consumers have encountered market-wide disclosure rules like price-labelling
requirements,58 nutrition facts, or truth-in-advertising laws.59 Less familiar are sector-specific

53

42 USCA § 1395cc(f)(1)(A).
Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 1367.10 (2007) (health-service plans disclosure of financial incentives).
55
For an extended treatment, see Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers
Direct Health Care? 35 American Journal of Law & Medicine 7, 62 - 65 (2009).
56
Robert Pear, Bush Proposes Linking the Medicare Drug Premium to Beneficiaries’ Income, NY Times,
Feb 16, 2008 (quoting Michael Levitt).
57
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58
E.g., N.Y. Agriculture and Markets Law 214-I (Consol. 2001).
59
See, e.g., § 15 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C § 55(a)(1) (1976) (when an advertisement is misleading). See
also Beales et al, supra note __, at 495-501.
54
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rules. Even a glimpse at the extensive and eclectic list shows how much law-makers rely on
mandated disclosure.
Notorious exploitation and improvident purchases have inspired statutes dealing with
“death products” – caskets, burial and funeral services, and cemetery plots60 The FTC’s Funeral
Industry Practices Rule requires price disclosures.61 States oblige service providers to disclose
matters relating to their expertise, the payment scheme, customers’ options to withdraw from
commitments, items not included in the “package,” and even notification that “THERE IS NO
SCIENTIFIC OR OTHER EVIDENCE THAT ANY CASKET WITH A SEALING DEVICE
WILL PRESERVE HUMAN REMAINS.”62
Many mandated disclosures apply to car transactions. Dealers must reveal problems with
the vehicle.63 Used-car sellers must report odometer readings (for the forgetful buyer?).64 Cartowing services must state their charges, policies, and insurance before towing.65 Repair shops
and parts sellers must disclose their fee structure and the kind of parts they use and give itemized
estimates.66 Many specific repairs, like installing ball joints, have their own information
mandates.67 Car rental agencies must describe customers’ liability for lost and damaged cars and
how it might be covered if customers decline rental-company insurance.68 Motor clubs that refer
members to dealers must reveal referral fees dealers pay.69
Real-estate agents must tell homebuyers about the agents’ duties to them.70 Residential
real-estate developers must name anyone owning at least 10% of the business. Residential
landlords must admit to code violations and provide case numbers of pending litigation.71 Time-

60

The classic expose is Jessica Mitford, The American Way of Death (Vintage, 2000).
39 C.F.R § 453 (especially § 453.2). See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, FACTS FOR BUSINESS:
COMPLYING
WITH
THE
FUNERAL
RULE
(2004),
available
online
at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/funeral.pdf.
62
For caskets, see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17530.7 (2007) (disclosures regarding the casket product and
that the seller is not a funeral director). For pre-need cemetery sales, see, Illinois Pre-Need Cemetery
Sales Act, 815 ILCS 390/14(a); for pre-need burial, see Illinois Funeral or Burial Funds Act, 225 ILCS
45/1a-1(a)(3)(A). See also Ill. Admin. Code Tit. 38, § 610 EXH. A (required disclosures include all the
term, descriptions, payment time, and cancellation policy).
63
Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.23 (2007) (disclosure if car was repurchased due to defect or is a “lemon law
buyback”); 625 ILCS 5/5-104.2 (1993)(disclose if car was repurchased due to failure of warranty).
64
Michigan MCLS § 257.233a (disclosure of odometer and whether it reflects actual mileage).
65
Illinois 625 ILCS 5/18d-120 and 5/18-130 (disclosure to vehicle owner or operation before towing of
damaged or disabled vehicle).
66
Automotive Repair Act, 815 ILCS 306/15, 306/20, and 306/50 (1998) and 815 ILCS 308/15, 20, and 50
(disclosure of estimated itemized repair costs); See also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code auto replacement parts
dealers; 9875.1 (2007)(disclose if repair parts are derived from secondary source and who warrants them);
67
Chicago 4-228 § 120 (disclosures regarding ball joint assemblies).
68
Cal. Civ. Code § 1936 (2008) (disclosures at the car rental counter).
69
Cal. Ins. Code § 12150(1) (2007) (disclosure by motor clubs of arrangements with referred dealers).
70
Michigan MCLS § 339.2517 (2008) (disclosure by real estate agent to buyers “all information known
to the buyer’s agent about the willingness of the seller to complete the sale or to accept a lower price.”)
71
Chicago 5-12 § 100 (disclosures affecting habitability).
61
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share programs must itemize customers’ prerogatives.72 Membership camping facilities must
reveal the operator’s experience, the chief officers’ business backgrounds, and much more.73
Mobil-home sellers or lessors must annually disclose fees, obligations, and rent increases.74
Home-improvement contracts and home-service and -repair contracts must disclose
clients’ rights, including a lay (but long) definition of a mechanic’s lien.75 Statutes even target
specific activities: alarm installer, for example, must disclose and define any mechanic’s lien.76
Vocational schools enjoy lengthy (and costly) disclosure mandates, including more than
20 statistics about graduation rates, re-enrollments, exam pass rates, graduates’ job prospects,
and more.77 Barber, nail, and cosmetology schools must disclose graduation rates and placement
statistics.78 Traffic-violator schools must astonish applicants with warnings that they might meet
repeat traffic offenders and that instructors are less robustly trained than those in licensed driving
schools (who in turn disclose quite a bit themselves).79 Colleges and universities must provide
current and prospective students with crime statistics.80
The list goes on: sellers of electricity must disclose their remuneration,81 immigration
consultants their past frauds,82 dog dealers and breeders the buyers’ rights to return sick or dead
animals.83 Travel services and agents must specify orally and in writing travelers’ right to certain
claims.84 Art dealers must reveal subtleties like medium, artist, and signature.85 Restaurants and
food establishments must warn about not-overcooked food.86 They also have to post signs in
72

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 11211, 11216 (2007) (disclosure in exchange program and in time-shares);
Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.302 (2007) (disclosures by camping operators regarding their experience and
record, as well as the facilities available).
74
Mobile Home Landlord and Tenant Rights Act, 765 ILCS 745/6.5 (2004).
75
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7159 (2007) (disclosure by home improvement contractors of multiple
aspects of the statutory rights and obligations, including what it means to be subject to a mechanic’s
lien.); §7159.10 (a long list of disclosures in service contracts between $500 and $750).
76
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7599.54 (2007) (disclosure by alarm installers).
77
Private Business and Vocational Schools Act, 105 ILCS 425/15.1 (Illinois disclosure statute applying to
enrollment in vocations schools).
78
Barber, Cosmetology, Esthetics, and Nail Technology Act, 225 ILCS 410/3B-12(a) (Illinois, 1985)
(numerous disclosures required in school enrollment agreements)
79
Cal. Veh. Code. § 11200(1) (2007) (disclosure by traffic violator schools); NJSA 13:23-5.16
(disclosure by driving schools).
80
20 USC § 1092(f).
81
220 ILCS 5/16-115C(e)(1) (disclosure by agent its income from third parties).
82
The Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/2AA (persons providing
“immigration assistance service” must disclose that they are not attorneys, not accredited to represent
before the government, and that they are not entitled to retain any documents for any purposes).
83
Cal. Health & Saf. Cod §§ 122100, 122190 (2007) (disclosure by breeders and by pet dealers of buyers’
right in case dogs purchased are ill or die).
84
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17550.13 (2007) (disclosure by “sellers of travel” of passengers’ rights to
make certain claims for refunds).
85
Cal. Civ. Cod. §§ 1742, 1744 (2007) (matters that must be disclosed prior to sale of fine print,
photograph, or sculpture).
86
Michigan MCLS § 289.6149 (2008) (public disclosure of risks of undercooked or raw food, and the
manner in which it has to be made).
73
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toilets reading: “No person who is affected with any disease in a communicable form, or is a
carrier of such disease, or who has a gastrointestinal disturbance, sore throat or a discharging or
infected wound, sore or lesion, shall handle food, drink, utensils, or equipment.”87 And food
dealers must explain “the basis upon which . . . [Halal] representations are made.”88
We have not exhausted the catalog of mandated disclosures, but we have surely
exhausted our readers (and ourselves). This sampling suggests that mandated disclosure is a
staple of the regulatory repertory.

II. THE DOCUMENTED FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE
The great paradox of the Disclosure Empire is that even as it grows, so also grows the
evidence that mandated disclosure repeatedly fails to accomplish its ends. We proffer several
kinds of evidence of that failure. First, disclosers do not always provide and disclosees do not
always receive information. Second, disclosees often do not read disclosed information, do not
understand it when they read it, and do not use it even if they understand it. Third, mandated
disclosure does not improve disclosees’ decisions. Following the model of the previous Part, we
first discuss the evidence about the three paradigmatic examples and then survey other areas.
A. The Three Paradigmatic Cases of Mandated Disclosure
1. The Terms of Credit
Truth-in-lending legislation is a crown jewel of the Disclosure Empire, and if mandated
disclosure works anywhere, it should work here. Unlike some disclosure regimes, TILA89 was
actually given thought. Congress spent eight years debating it. The bill’s proponents largely got
the law they wanted.90 They expected disclosure of APRs to produce sensible shopping for
credit. Administrative agencies have repeatedly labored and issued regulations intended to make
TILA work.
Consumers are more aware of APRs, but they remain confused about using them. One
leading study, for example, showed that as knowledge of the APR increased, knowledge of the
finance charge itself (expressed in dollars) declined.91 Many studies find consumers’
understanding of APRs severely limited.92 Apparently, most consumers (mistakenly) think the
disclosed rate is a percentage of the initial balance, rather than the average or declining balance.
So they consistently imagine the finance charges are twice the actual figure. In short, truth-in-

87

Chicago city ordinance [CITE]
815 ILCS 505/2LL(a) (2007).
89
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq., especially § 1606 and §§ 1631-49.
90
Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80
Georgetown L. J. 233, 242 (1991).
88

91
92

Regina Y. Chang and Sherman Hanna, Consumer Credit Search Behaviori, 16 J. Consumer Stud. &
Home Econ. 207 (1992); James H. McAlexander and Debra L. Scammon, Are Disclosures Sufficient? A
Micro Analysis of Impact in the Financial Services Market, 7 J. Pub. Pol’y & Marketing 186 (1988);
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lending legislation has made consumers more aware but left them poorly informed.93
Furthermore, understanding of terms TILA doesn’t cover – like the dollar amount of finance
charges in open-end credit transactions – is poor. For example, 90% of consumers misunderstand
the relation between the interest rate lenders quote and the APR and thus misperceive the cost of
credit.94 Worse, only well-educated and well-off consumers seem to have enjoyed whatever
increased awareness of credit terms TILA brought.95
More fundamentally, there is little reason to think disclosure statutes improved the terms
borrowers pay. For example, one study suggests that the Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act
of 1988 did not increase competition in the credit card industry. Interest rates and funding costs
did not exhibit any measurable improvement following the disclosure act.96
2. Informed Consent
Informed consent has been conventional wisdom so long enough that many studies
explore it. They show that informed consent does not achieve its purpose.97 First, doctors give
patients nothing like the information they would need to make educated decisions. For example,
Braddock et al examined discussions between doctors and patients, particularly “(1) the patient's
role in decision making, (2) the nature of the decision, (3) alternatives, (4) pros (benefits) and
cons (risks) of the alternatives, (5) uncertainties associated with the decision, (6) an assessment
of the patient's understanding of the decision, and (7) an exploration of the patient's preferences.”
The “completeness of informed decision making was low. . . . [F]ew decisions (9.0%) met
criteria for completeness of informed decision making.”98
Second, good ways to communicate information have proved elusive. Forms used to
provide information frequently exceed readability standards.99 “Many patients have limited
health literacy and can have difficulty understanding information even when efforts are made to
communicate it appropriately.100

93

Rubin, supra note &&, at 235-236.
Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, The Price of Money: Consumers Understanding of APRs and
Contract Interest Rates, 18 Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 66, 67 (1999).
95
Jean Kinsey and Ray McAlister, Consumer Knowledge of the Costs of Open-End-Credit, 15 J.
Consumer Affairs 249 (1981).
96
Sherrill Shaffer, The Competitive Impact of Disclosure Requirements in the Credit Card Industry, 15
Journal of Regulatory Economics 183, (1999).
97
For a brief exposition of this case, see Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, Wake Forest L Rev 411
(2006). For a detailed assessment of it, see Carl E. Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients,
Doctors, and Medical Decisions (Oxford U Press, 1998). For an extended comparison of the law of
informed consent and the reality of it, see the first chapter of Marsha Garrison & Carl E. Schneider, The
Law of Bioethics: Individual Autonomy and Social Regulation (West, 2009) (2nd ed).
98
Decision Making in Outpatient Practice: Time to Get Back to Basics, 282 JAMA 2313 (1999).
99
M.K. Paasche-Orlow et al, Readability Standards for Informed-Consent Forms as Compared with
Actual Readability, 20 NEJM 348 (2003).
100
Margaret L. Schwarze et al, Exploring Patient Preferences for Infrainguinal Bypass Operation, 202
Journal of the American College of Surgeons 445, 450 (2006) (doi: 10.1016/j.jamcollsurg.2005.11.009).
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Third, and critically, even when doctors lavish information on patients, many of them
neither understand nor remember it. Even when asked simple questions immediately after far
more education than clinicians can ever offer, patients commonly can answer only a third to a
half of them.101 Endless studies reveal that despite extravagant efforts at educating patients,
they cannot remember and presumably have not really understood the risks of treatment that
were revealed to them. While memory of risk disclosures is most often studied, there is also
highly plausible evidence that patients do not properly understand the possible benefits of
treatments. In one study, for example, “patients’ expectations of improvements in their
functional status after infrainguinal bypass operation were greater than those suggested by
previous research.”102
Fourth, despite decades of legal and medical efforts, patients regularly make life and
death decisions without the most basic information and with many misconceptions. In one large
study, for example, fewer than half the breast-cancer patients understood survival rates and fewer
than a fifth understood recurrence rates, even though the patients thought those factors important
and had consulted “a relatively large variety of information sources.”103 Fifth, even if these
educational problems could be solved, the information proffered would frequently go unused.
Patients rarely change their minds when given informed consent.104 Patients numerously prefer
not to make medical decisions, and the sicker and older they are, the less they wish to do so.
Furthermore, patients frequently make decisions before having been “consented” and often rely
on a single factor.105
Could informed consent work if only doctors tried harder? No. Even the most dedicated
efforts disappoint. For example, one study truly tried to enlighten patients about conflicts of
interest created by the ways HMOs paid doctors. It “went to unusual lengths to ensure that the
essential information was conveyed. Information . . . was disclosed by mail, followed by phone
calls in which subjects’ understanding was tested and reinforced through repetition and simple
quiz questions.” While knowledge of incentives was greatly increased, a majority still could not
correctly answer more than half of the questions.106 “[E]ven the extensive and [desperately]
impractical methods used here to attempt to convey only limited knowledge of incentives fell
well short of complete success.”107
Even when legislatures have made special efforts to use informed consent in focused
ways, the news has been discouraging. Statutes have used expert boards to formulate special
101

E.g., David A. Herz et al, Informed Consent: Is It a Myth?, 30 Neurosurgery 453 (1992).
Margaret L. Schwarze et al, Exploring Patient Preferences for Infrainguinal Bypass Operation, 202
Journal of the American College of Surgeons 445, 449 (2006) (doi: 10.1016/j.jamcollsurg.2005.11.009).
103
Angela Fagerlin et al, An Informed Decision? Breast Cancer Patients and Their Knowledge About
Treatment, ___ Patient Education & Counseling ___ (2006).
104
Ruth R. Faden, et al, Disclosure of Information to Patients in Medical Care, 19 Medical Care 718, 732
(1981); Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz, & Alan Meisel, Informed Consent: Legal Theory and
Clinical Practice 202 (Oxford U Press, 1987).
105
Carl E. Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical Decisions (Oxford U
Press, 1998).
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Mark A. Hall et al, How Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives Affects Trust, 21 Health Affairs 197,
203 (2002).
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Ibid at 205.
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disclosures about mastectomies and even threatened physician-discipline procedures.108 But
while these statutes were “associated with slight increases (6 to 13 percent)” in use of
lumpectomies, the “increases were transient, . . . lasting from 3 to 12 months.”109
If informed consent should work anywhere, it is in consent to participate in research: The
disclosures’ exact words and procedures must be approved in advance by a regulatory agency
(the IRB). But again the evidence is disappointing. For example, trials of cancer treatments are
riskier than most research, so disclosures have been extensively examined. Research subjects
have urgent reasons to understand their choices. In an especially careful but otherwise typical
study, extravagant time was spent educating the subjects. They lengthily assessed their choices
and consulted “additional sources of information and had support from family or friends.
Nonetheless, knowledge varied widely and there were important misunderstandings. Major
deficiencies included not being aware of non-standard treatment, the potential for incremental
risk or discomfort, the unproven nature of treatment, and the uncertainty of benefits to self.” 110
More specifically, many of them “did not realize that the treatment being researched was not
proven to be the best for their cancer, that the study used non-standard treatments or procedures,
that participation might carry incremental risk, or that they might not receive direct medical
benefit from participation.”111
A final indication of the failure of informed consent is that its advocates must continue to
add new disclosures for it to work. Standard informed consent having failed, one study advocates
adding all this: (1) “[I]n-depth exploration by providers of patients' affective and cognitive
processes.” (2) Exploration of “uncertainties and limitations both in the provider's own
knowledge and in the state of the science.” (3) An inquiry into patients’ “motivations, beliefs,
and values.” (4) Exploration of how patients think decisions should be made. (5) An
individualized process “in the context of an ongoing relationship with a trusted health care
provider.”112
3. Contract Boilerplate
Even when the standard form contract is available, very few people read it. Empirical work
is scant, perhaps because of the folk knowledge that no one reads boilerplate. Still, some direct
as well as indirect evidence suggests that almost no consumers read boilerplate, even when it is
fully and conspicuously disclosed.
Anecdotal evidence comes from an experiment by PCpitstop.com, which put a clause in an
end-user license agreement promising $1000 to a user who responded. After four months and
108

Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85
Iowa L Rev 261 (1999).
109
Ann Butler Nattinger et al, The Effect of Legislative Requirements on the Use of Breast-Conserving
Surgery, 335 NEJM 1035 (1996).
110
Steven Joffe et al, Quality of Informed Consent in Cancer Clinical Trials: A Cross-Sectional Survey,
358 Lancet 1772, 1775 (2001).
111
Ibid at 1774.
112
Gail Geller et al, “Decoding” Informed Consent: Insights from Women Regarding Breast Cancer
Susceptibility Testing, 27 Hastings Center Report 28 (March/April 1997).
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3000 downloads someone finally did.113 (All this in a forum for the sophisticated and savvy.)
More systematically, Bakos et al found that roughly 1 in 1000 people actually scrolls through
online boilerplate, when it is disclosed prior to the agreement.114 Worse, that “reader” spent a
median time of 29 seconds on the webpage. Since these pages of legalese average over 2,000
words, since people can read fewer than 150 words in that time, and since boilerplate is
notoriously complex, readership is effectively zero.115
B. The Failures of Other Mandated Disclosures
The Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) requires health-care institutions to tell patients
about advance directives so that they might decide how they should be treated when incompetent
to make decisions. The living will is the primary means of doing so. The PSDA appears not to
have encouraged people to use living wills, and living wills cannot easily reflect people’s
considered preferences or state them in effective ways.116 In short, the law “has ‘done a
disservice to most real patients and their families and caregivers.’ It has promoted the execution
of uninformed and under-informed advance directives … . The PSDA looks like a utter
failure.”117 Many efforts have been made to help consumers in the various instantiations of
consumer-directed health-care. Surveys of patients and clinicians suggest that report cards have
little effect.118 Patients are rarely aware of these disclosures, and even more rarely understand
and use them.119 A study of Medicare beneficiaries, for example, showed that 90% either knew
nothing or had limited knowledge about HMOs, and only 16 percent had adequate knowledge to
choose between traditional Medicare and an HMO.120 Another study found that 67% of
respondents did not have a good grasp of the differences between traditional fee-for-service and
HMO plans, and many did not know the most fundamental facts about HMO plans. Only about
20% of insurance purchasers reported using any systematic approach for selecting highperforming, cost-effective plans. Most purchasers just looked to see if the plan was accredited,

113

See http://pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.asp.
Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, and David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?
Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts (Mimeo., 2009).
115
In a less rigorous study, Robert Hillman surveyed first-year Cornell Contracts students on their
readership of boilerplate and found XX. See Robert Hillman, Online Standard Form Contracting
Practices – A Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications, in IS CONSUMER PROTECTION AN
ANACHRONISM IN THE INFORMATION ECONOMY (2006) We suspect this study significantly overstates
true readership ratios. It is not clear that reports by the survey subjects are credible. Furthermore, the
findings apply at best to an amiable but atypical population—contract-law students.
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For an extended defense of this position, see Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The
Failure of the Living Will, 34 Hastings Center Report 30 (March/April 2004).
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and did not personally investigate any other aspects.121
Evaluations of medical care and disclosure of “report cards” might produce better care
even if consumers rarely read the evaluations, since providers presumably will work to win good
reviews. Indeed, some studies based on clinical data speak of significant improvements in care,
but these findings notoriously struggle with selection biases.122 One study showed that providers
seek to protect their ratings by shifting their efforts from unreported dimensions of care toward
the reported dimensions and found no evidence that overall quality of care had increased.123 A
recent and refined study concluded that report cards had undesirable consequences. 124 First,
providers became reluctant to treat severely ill patients, which led to reduced welfare for those
neediest patients. Second, report cards led to sorting of patients to providers based on the
severity of illness, with the healthier patients being treated in higher rated hospitals and sicker
patients treated in hospitals with worse grades. This, along with the tendency to substitute
towards more cautious but less effective medical therapies, led to higher costs and worse
outcomes, especially for sicker patients.
HIPAA regulations prescribe numerous rules for doctors and hospitals intended to protect
patients’ privacy. Studies show, however, that the disclosure forms are written at a level
hopelessly beyond the reading level of most people.125 Other findings indicate that nobody tries
to read the HIPAA forms. (The University of Michigan Hospital’s form runs to six large pages
of print so small that Schneider cannot read it with his glasses on.)126 Mandated disclosure of
privacy policies outside health care do no better. For example, a survey of internet users found
that less than 1% of them even noticed the disclosed policies.127
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One area in which disclosure seems relatively successful is nutrition labeling. Many
Americans report being more aware of nutrition facts and changing their purchasing. For
example, Alan Mathios suggests that even before mandatory nutrition labeling, low-fat salad
dressing had voluntary disclosures, but labeling forced high-fat level to be explicitly exposed and
thus buyers could distinguish between the worse and the worst, thus associated with a decline in
sales for the highest fat products.128 But the question is how to distinguish between correlation
and causation. Changes in consumption, especially the rise of demand for low-fat foods and the
decline in demand for high-fat foods, are associated with mandated disclosure, but the trend may
have been set before the disclosure regulation, as a result of various factors: consumer change of
tastes, the obesity plague, aggressive advertising by low-fat food manufacturers, and more.
Furthermore, consumers have other ways to acquire nutrition information. Manufacturers
highlight nutrition advantages and make comparative claims. Perversely, because of disclosure
mandates in the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, the amount of nutrition information in
manufacturers’ advertising and voluntary campaigns narrowed substantially. Fewer comparative
claims are made; claims focus on narrower issues (e.g., total fat); and advertising of “good
foods” like fruits and vegetables has fallen significantly.129 To be sure, voluntarily disclosed
information can be biased and misleading, and the FTC has been monitoring it. But if mandatory
merely replaces voluntary disclosure its value is questionable.
It is also sobering that while food labeling affects people’s decisions, few succeed in
changing their overall diets. It is found, for example, that reduced consumption of one high-fat
food (e.g., red meat) is offset by increased consumption of another high-fat food (e.g, dairy
products).130
Two kinds of evidence suggest the scope of the failure of Miranda warnings. First, those
warnings are not understood. Asked to paraphrase Miranda provisions directly after hearing
each provision, “[o]nly 38.5% of detainees achieved good comprehension for the easy (< sixth
grade) level, and substantially fewer (20.5%) achieved good comprehension for the moderate
(8th to 10th grade) level. . . . [V]ery few detainees (6.8%) accurately recalled even at the easy (<
sixth grade) level that there is no cost for a court-appointed attorney.”131 Thus, for example,
when Rogers “examined whether college students espousing knowledge of their Miranda rights
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were accurate in their self-appraisals,” he found that “[n]early all (95.6%) believed that any
confession would nullify their right to counsel.”132
The second kind of evidence that Miranda does not work as intended is that “the
overwhelming majority of suspects (some 78% to 96%) waive their rights . . . . This . . . has not
been disputed by scholars on any side of the Miranda debate. As Patrick Malone pointed out . .
. ‘Miranda warnings have little or no effect on a suspect’s propensity to talk . . . . Next to the
warning label on cigarette packs, Miranda is the most widely ignored piece of official advice in
our society.’”133
Even people with every advantage are unhelped. Yale faculty, staff, graduate students,
and undergraduates were interrogated by the FBI after a ‘60s draft protest. The warnings were
“almost wholly ineffective, and this obtains even when the suspect is intelligent, and the
interrogation is polite, noncustodial, and at the suspect’s home.”134 Each man waived his rights,
and after being better informed about the legal meaning of doing so, regretted it.
We could go on. We could say, for example, that disclosure by used car dealers of items
such as prior use, odometer readings, warranties, and safety checks did nothing to improve the
excess price paid by poor buyers relative to more wealthy ones.135 But we will stop this survey
here. At this point, we prefer to shift to another, more fundamental step of our argument—a
theoretical exploration why mandated disclosure is so likely to fail.

III. WHY MANDATED DISCLOSURE FAILS
We have shown that mandated disclosure regularly – though not inevitably – fails to
achieve its purpose of improving disclosees’ decisions. We next argue that failure is inherent in
the regulatory technique. Success requires three “actors” – law-makers, disclosers, and
disclosees – to play their parts properly. Each part is challenging. Rarely can each actor meet all
accomplish all that is needed, and so rarely does mandated disclosure succeed.
A. Law-Makers
For mandated disclosure to work, the law-maker must set the mandates correctly. First, it
must correctly identify a problem that needs a regulatory solution. Second, it must correctly
decide that mandated disclosure is appropriate. Third, it must correctly decide what disclosure to
mandate. Fourth, it must correctly and comprehensibly articulate the standard of disclosure.
Each step is problematic, and the law-maker’s incentives lead it toward excessive mandates:
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there are incentives to regulate when regulation is unnecessary, to use mandated disclosure when
it is ineffective, to state mandates too broadly, and to articulate standards too loosely.
1. Is Regulation Necessary?
Law-makers live amid demands for action. “Trouble stories” – tales of someone’s
misfortune that might represent a systematic problem – inspire many of these demands. The
family that lost a house to foreclosure, the patient who died, and the swindled consumer evoke
sympathy and anger. Indignation, political pressure, and a sense of duty drive law-makers to try
to prevent the story from recurring.
Trouble stories, however, are dubious bases for regulation. They are anecdotes and may
not represent a problem extensive and serious enough to necessitate regulation. For example, the
atrocities of Nazi doctors and the Public Health Service research at Tuskegee have been the
primary justification for the system of university and hospital committees that license “humansubject” research. Troubling though these stories are, they tell us little about how often and how
seriously people in this country in this era are injured by unethical medical researchers, much
less by unethical social scientists.
Another example. A decade ago a research subject died. A researcher had a financial
interest in a company that might have benefited if the research succeeded. 136 This trouble story
has become central in “proving” that researchers with financial interests in their work will be
dangerously zealous. Exemplifying the over-reaction scandals provide, “one conflict of interest
committee chair remarked, ‘The future of academic health centers depends on [conflict of
interest oversight] being done right.’”137 Researchers may be tempted to take advantage of
research subjects for financial gain, but are they tempted and do they succumb often enough to
justify regulating conflicts of interest?
Not only are trouble stories often unrepresentative, they are asymmetrical. They push in
only one direction – toward regulation. What might induce lawmakers to forego or revoke
regulation? What would be evidence that the problem was infrequent and minor? While the
pressure for more is salient, politically charged, and time-sensitive, the pressure for less is not.
The injured research subject or the defrauded consumer is conspicuous; the people who can be
saved by suppressed research, or the consumers who pay for regulation remain anonymous.
2. Is Mandated Disclosure the Best Form of Regulation?
Mandated disclosure is a Lorelei, luring law-makers onto the rocks of regulatory failure.
It is alluring because it resonates with two fundamental American ideologies. The first is freemarket principles. While mandated disclosure constrains unfettered rapacity and counteracts
caveat emptor, the intervention is soft and leaves everything substantive alone: prices, quality,
entry. Instead of specifying the outcomes of transactions or dictating choices, it proffers
136
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information for making better decisions.138 Second, mandated disclosure serves the autonomy
principle. It implements the belief that people make better decisions for themselves than anyone
can make for them and that people are presumptively entitled to freedom in making decisions.
The more-information-is-better mantra seems to serve both the free-market and autonomy
principles. The mantra convinces widely and well. In defending mandated disclosure, the Federal
Trade Commission said, “It is a basic tenet of our economic system that information in the hands
of consumers facilitates rational purchase decisions; and, moreover, is an absolute necessity for
efficient functions of the economy.”139 The political appeal of the mantra is further evidenced by
the ease with which law-makers mandate disclosure. For example, a flagship disclosure statute
— the Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968 – passed by ninety-two to zero majority in the Senate.140
The PSDA passed without opposition in the Senate.141 Courts adopted informed consent with
little apparent doubt.
Mandated disclosure appeals to law-makers for other reasons. First, it looks cheap. It
requires almost no government expenditures, and its costs seem to be imposed on the villain of
the story, the stronger party who withholds information.
Second, mandated disclosure looks easy. It only requires more communication between
parties who are already communicating. In hindsight, one can usually identify the information
that could have led the disclosee to a better conclusion. For example, Rena Truman’s doctor
repeatedly urged her to have a Pap smear but did not specify the consequences of not having one.
She died of cervical cancer. The California Supreme Court apparently reasoned like the dissenter
on the Court of Appeal: “[C]an it be doubted that, had the decedent in this case known that for
$6 and mild discomfort she could discover the existence of cervical cancer and thus survive, she
would have taken the test? Central to her failure to take the test was a clear lack of understanding
of the significance of the doctor's recommendation.”142
Third, mandated disclosure looks effective. Mandated information often seems relevant
to a difficult decision. If asked, consumers often say they want the information. Even
unenthusiastic commentators imagine that while mandates may not help, they cannot hurt. And
the dogma of disclosure seems unfalsifiable: Even when it fails, it only means that the content of
138
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the disclosure needs to be revised or enhanced. For example, despite a long and long-standing
list of mandated disclosures in mortgage agreements, an epidemic of irrational and devastating
borrowing produced a sub-prime mortgage disaster, a foreclosure surge, and a broad financial
crisis.
Despite proposals to regulate mortgages substantively and oversee lenders more
closely,143 commentators and reformers still consider disclosures central to the solution.144 For
example, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act requires lenders to disclose the new, allinclusive version of the APR three days before the deal.145
For all these reasons, law-makers rarely inquire into disclosure’s effectiveness or burden.
For example, “only limited discussions of the potential costs and benefits of the PSDA occurred
during the legislative process.”146 Similarly, the courts that primarily created the duty of
informed consent barely asked whether patients want to make medical decisions, whether
doctors could provide and patients could use the mandated information, whether patients would
make better decisions with more information, or what informed consent would cost.147
In short, when law-makers are pressed to act, mandated disclosure is appealing. Its critics
are few.148 The law-maker can be seen to have acted. The fisc is unmolested. The people most
visibly burdened—the disclosers—rarely dare resist vigorously and prefer disclosure to yet
harsher regulation. Easy alternatives are few. Disclosure’s political utility does much to explain
its use and over-use.149
143

Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia M. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1255, 1269 (2002); Pottow, Tort liability for reckless lending; See
also U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. & U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage
Lending: A Joint Report 17 (2000) (http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/curbing.html).
144
HUD-Treasury Report, supra note 10, at 67 (proposing that originators be required to provide an
accurate, within a prescribed tolerance, Good Faith Estimate (GFE) of, among other things, the APR). See
also FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 63-65 (Dept of Treasury 2009) (proposing new formats for
financial disclosures that would be less technical and tested for their readability). See Elizabeth Renuart
and Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, The Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise
of Truth in Lending, 25 Yale. J. Reg. 181 (2008) (Proposing a comprehensive APR measure); Oren BarGill, The Law, Economics, Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 Cornell L. Rev. (2009)
(providing one of the more nuanced and careful views of disclosure reform).
145
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub.L. 110-289, Sec. 2502(a), 15 U.S.C. 1638(b)(2).
146
Jeremy Sugarman et al., The Cost of Ethics Legislation: A Look at the Patient Self-Determination Act,
3 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 387, 389 (1993).
147
See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
148
For some early skepticism, see Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale,
64 Mich. L. Rev. 1285, 1320-22 (1966); Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1, 1-11 (1969); Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 Yale L.J. 745 (1967). Some
economists who expect businesses to volunteer information if consumers want it have criticized mandated
disclosure, if faintly. See, e.g., Grossman, Sanford J., The Informational Role of Warranties and Private
Disclosure of Product Quality, 24 J. Law & Econ. 461 (1981); Michael J. Fishman and Kathleen M.
Hagerty, Mandatory Disclosure, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
605 (P. Newman, Ed. 1998); A. Mitchell Polinksy and Steven Shavell, Mandatory Versus Voluntary
Disclosure of Product Risks, Stanford Olin Working Paper, No. 327 (2006).
149
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules
Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70
Va. L. Rev. 1083 (1984) (describing the shift from usury laws to disclosure regulation).

25
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art9

26

Ben-Shahar and Schneider:

3. What Is the Proper Scope of the Disclosure Mandate?
Mandated disclosure’s appeal to law-makers and the allure of the more-is-better mantra
lead law-makers to mandate disclosure too often and too broadly. Furthermore, disclosure’s
logic is inherently expansive. Only broad disclosure accommodates the variety of disclosees and
circumstances. One can always imagine a disclosee for whom one more datum might help.
Furthermore, it is hard to anticipate what data will prove useful, so safety seems to lie in broad
mandates.
For example, what information about conflicts of interests ought researchers disclose?
Conflicts may include “the award of stock contingent on certain occurrences, licensing rights,
‘put’ options, seed money for commercial start-ups, limited partnership and other joint venture
opportunities, royalty-based payments, and specialized grant funding to individual investigators
and to institutions.”150 Worse, incentive’s effects “vary in intensity and impact depending on the
overall context, such as the number of other investigators sharing the same incentive, how the
incentive is actually calculated, the amount of money to be earned compared to an investigator’s
other compensation sources, the time period over which the incentive is applied, and whether the
institution as a whole shares in the incentive.”151 All these data might be relevant; what can be
excluded?
Mandates also multiply when nobody knows what information disclosees need. For
example, hospitals, physicians, and schools must disclose “report cards”—information about
their performance, where performance depends both on the skill and effort of the producer and
the characteristics of their patients/students. However, despite decades of research, scholars
have not found reliable indicia of medical quality, principally because it has proved impossible
to factor out all the influences on medical success. And since exceptional doctors attract risky
cases, success may not reflect skill.
In addition, trouble stories never stop. No regulation can eliminate problems, and
mandated disclosure barely reduces them. So there is constant pressure to expand the mandate to
cover newly noticed contingencies, and the scope of mandates ratchets ever up, never down.
One might set the mandate’s scope by asking consumers what information they want.
Alas, they say “virtually everything.” When choosing health-care plans, they want to know
about “(1) access . . . ; (2) amount of paperwork; (3) benefits; (4) choice of provider . . . ; (5)
communication/interpersonal skills/caring of provider; (6) convenience . . . ; (7) coordination of
care; (8) costs; (9) courtesy . . . ; (10) hospital ratings; (11) good value for the money; (12) plan
administrative hassles; and (13) quality . . . .”152 In one large study, 76% of the patients
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questioned “would want to hear of any adverse effects [of a treatment], no matter how rare.” And
83% wanted to know about any “serious adverse effect, no matter how rare.”153
If people knew how much they are asking for, they would not say such things. Given
much less information, they still use much less than that. For example, “the Minnesota Health
Data Institute distributed a 16-page, statewide report card that featured comparison tables and
color-coded graphs of consumer satisfaction within categories of health plans and compared 38
plans based on 20 performance measures.” However, “[c]onsumers found the report cards
cumbersome, complex, and detailed.”154
Furthermore, in at least some areas (like medicine) people numerously profess
themselves pleased with the amount of information they have, however scant it is. For example,
one review of the literature reports that “[p]atient satisfaction with the quality of information
provided, was usually high, despite frequent poor recall.”
Another reason mandates expand is that disclosees interpret information unexpectedly.
Thus while patients and research subjects are supposed to be warned of the evils of doctors’ and
researchers’ conflicts of interest, at least one study found that some people “perceived financial
interests as a positive sign that the investigator would be invested in ensuring a study was done
well.”155 Such problems drive law-makers to insist on broader disclosures so that disclosees
really understand the problem right away.156
4. Can the Quantity Question Be Answered?
We have argued that several forces drive law-makers to over-use mandated disclosure
and to setting its scope expansively. All this leads to the recurring and crucial “quantity
question.” The quantity question has two principal aspects. The first is the familiar “overload”
effect. When disclosure mandates are too detailed, both disclosers and disclosees have trouble
coping with it. The forms become so complex and so long that disclosers have trouble
assembling and organizing the information. Disclosees do not read them, and cannot understand
and assimilate and analyze the quantity of information they contain.157
The classic overload statement is Miller’s “magical number seven,”158 that being more or
less the number of items people can keep in their short-term memory. This number is
surprisingly easy to exceed. For example, Miranda warnings average 96 words and range up to
153
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408 words. Rogers invokes Miller’s number and concludes that even with “verbal chunking”
(combining smaller items into a single item for easier memory storage) “the upper limit of
information processing for Miranda warnings is likely less than 75 words . . . .” Even cued,
people “with less than a 12th grade education recalled only 55.8% of the verbal material.” And
this overstates understanding, since “many suspects have cognitive deficits and are further
impaired by highly stressful circumstances” and since “the mere recitation of concepts cannot be
equated with genuine understanding.”159 The same problem proliferates in medicine. In one
study, for example, “[a]nesthesiologists and nurse practitioners vastly exceeded patients’ shortterm memory capacity.”160
Law-makers have no good solution to this problem. If they mandate incomplete
disclosure, people may be unable to choose knowledgeably. Law-makers lack good criteria for
eliminating information. A sophisticated law-maker could recognize that “less is more” but at
the same time fear that “less is not enough.”
The quantity question’s second aspect—one that has not been noticed until now—is the
“accumulation” problem: While law-makers consider disclosure issue by issue, in real life each
disclosure competes for a disclosees’ time and attention with other mandated disclosures, with
knowledge people obtain without mandates, and with everything people do besides collect
information for and make decisions. One disclosure by itself may seem trivial, but many
disclosures may be overwhelming.
Law-makers are largely shielded from the accumulation problem. What law-maker would
oppose a consumer financial disclosure rule because too many disclosures—in unrelated areas—
are already—and are competing for people’s attention. Law-makers simply don’t make such
macro evaluations. Even if law-makers wanted to thin down the disclosure landscape by
selecting only a few critical areas in which disclosure rules ought to be used, they have neither
the competence nor and incentives to make such selections, and the legislative process offers few
opportunities for trying.
5. Can the Standard of Disclosure Be Articulated Effectively?
Suppose the lawmaker has identified a genuine problem, it is appropriate for mandated
disclosure, and the mandate’s scope has been well gauged. The lawmaker must now articulate
the mandate. A wide continuum of standards ranges from vague general statements to lists of
specific data. Informed consent exemplifies the former end: What information would a
reasonable patient want in making the decision? Miranda exemplifies the latter end: a set of
words so fixed and specific that television addicts recite them from memory. Alas, both ends of
the continuum are problematic. The specific end requires extraordinary prescience and precision.
Perversely, this is likeliest when information is already well known. Thus it became easier to
write intelligible cigarette warnings after smoking’s dangers were common knowledge. The
vague end of the spectrum may solve these problems, but it gives disclosers scant guidance. And
159
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without specific guidance, disclosers that fear enforcement of the disclosure regime will seek
safety in overbroad disclosures.
Law-makers may be concerned not only with what must be disclosed, but also with how.
A hint of the difficulties this poses is provided by the problem of disclosing conflicts of interest
to research subjects. In one survey of researchers and regulators, some thought
that the financial disclosure should occur early in the consent process, and some
respondents suggested that a disclosure statement should appear near the top of
the consent document. There was also support for highlighting the disclosure in
some way, but this suggestion raises the concern that such highlighting might
communicate to potential research participants that the financial disclosure is
more important than other components of the consent document.161
To put the point differently, the law-maker has an inherently difficult task. Both the
market-failure and the autonomy rationales for mandated disclosure assume that disclosees and
their circumstances, preferences, and choices are various. Given all this variety, the law-maker’s
task is baffling.
In sum, the law-maker’s incentives are to use mandated disclosure even where it is
inappropriate and to mandate disclosure too broadly. Furthermore, those incentives persist even
after the law-maker has initially acted. Trouble stories continue to reveal that any current
disclosure regime has not ended the trouble. And experience continually reveals new data that
might reasonably improve disclosees’ decisions. Thus, disclosure mandates tend to grow and
rarely shrink.
B. Disclosers
The second prerequisite to mandated disclosure is that the disclosers provide the
mandated information. Even under the optimistic assumption that disclosers will strive to
comply with disclosure requirements, much will keep them from doing so usefully.
1. Interpreting the Mandate
First, the discloser must determine what to disclose. But for reasons we just explained,
law-makers’ mandates can be frustratingly vague. Consider contract law’s disclosure norms. The
seller cannot practically imagine and describe everything about a contract any imaginable buyer
might ever want to know. But if not everything, how much? The common law has struggled to
find a formula. Some non-disclosures are regarded as fraudulent concealment and are subject to
standard anti-fraud sanctions, but mandated disclosure is intended to go beyond anti-fraud rules.
The Restatement of Contracts requires disclosure of facts that would “correct a mistake of the
other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the contract.”162 But the
ambiguity of this suggests why legislators had to supplement it with brighter-line rules on, say,
which advertising practices are deceptive.
161
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Or consider doctors’ duty to provide information “a reasonable person . . . would be
likely to attach significance [to] . . . in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed
therapy”).163 You’re the doctor. A drug’s side effects include
excess stomach acid secretion, irritation of the stomach or intestines, nausea, vomiting,
heartburn, stomach cramps, bronchospasm, stomach ulcers, intestinal ulcers, hepatitis,
stomach or intestinal bleeding, inflammation of skin, redness of skin, itching, hives, rash,
wheezing, trouble breathing, life-threatening allergic reaction, giant hives, rupture in the
wall of the stomach or intestines, hemolytic anemia, large skin blotches, decreased blood
platelets, decreased white blood cells, and decreased appetite.164
Which side effects do you describe? The likeliest? The gravest? Does your answer change if you
know the drug is aspirin?
The informed-consent standard is yet more problematic than this, since it requires the
disclosure of information patients need to make a decision, not just disclosure of side-effects of
treatment. A common problem, for example, is that “patients may regard a particular outcome of
treatment as highly undesirable but then . . . learn to tolerate it well.”165 For example, while
many people initially refuse colostomies, they commonly adapt to them. So what should the
doctor tell the patient? Ubel et al examine a standard “relatively complete” description of
colostomies and find that even it “lacks relevant details. What does it mean, for example, to
have ‘no voluntary control’ of the colostomy? What is involved in maintaining a colostomy?
What percentage of men will develop impotence? Moreover, the description never really shows
people what a colostomy looks like or how it operates.” In sum, descriptions of illnesses and
treatments “are necessarily incomplete, and patients and the public are likely to fill in the blanks
idiosyncratically, with information based on their own personal experiences or stereotypes.”166
When a mandate is stated broadly, disclosers might think that duty requires – or prudence
demands – disclosing everything. For example, HIPAA obliges providers to tell patients what
providers may legitimately do with patients’ health information. This has produced disclosures
so detailed and deadly that we relegate our gruesome example to a footnote.167
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The problems with aspirin’s side effects came from a vague mandate, the problems with
HIPAA from a broad one. Equally baffling problems can come from complex mandates. For
example, the Federal Reserve issued Regulation Z to tell creditors how to comply with TILA:
Regulation Z, while it did not salvage Truth-In-Lending’s basic goals, did succeed
in making the statute too complex to be complied with. Well-meaning creditors
could not comply with it. Well-counseled creditors could not comply with it. The
pamphlets published by the Federal Reserve Board to help creditors comply with
it did not comply with it. . . . [M]any [creditors] found Regulation Z a conundrum
too deep for either good will or high-priced intellect to solve.”168
Similarly, politicians, patients, and physicians have wanted to require disclosure of
conflicts of interest created by capitation methods of paying doctors. But nobody knows which
interests matter, especially when potential conflicts are mediated by factors such as “size of the
patient panel, amount of the capitation sum, refinement of risk adjustments, dollar value of stoploss provisions, and scope of risk . . . [It also depends on] such relative intangibles as the force of
professional ethics and fear of malpractice suits.169 As the president of one HMO association
said, HMOs “can tell people whether we have a withhold, bonus payments or capitation” but
“there are literally over 100,000 ways to pay, and these systems are very proprietary” and “the
plans change them all the time.”170
A damning illustration of how hard it is to determine what disclosures are required comes
from the IRB system. There a regulatory agency (the IRB), not the discloser, decides what
information to give potential research subjects. Yet faced with a single protocol, IRBs disagree
enormously about what subjects should be told and how they should be told it.171 This
illustration is damning because the discloser – with all its reasons to flout mandates – is removed
from the picture, and the decision has been handed over to an experienced and presumably expert
agency.
2. Assembling the Data

services, and auditing functions, including fraud and abuse detection and compliance programs; business
planning and development; and business management and general administrative activities, including data
and information systems management, customer service, resolution of internal grievances, and sales,
mergers, transfers, or consolidations with other providers or health plans or prospective providers or
health plans.” University of Michigan Health Services, Notice of Privacy Practices, online at
http://www.med.umich.edu/quality/toolkit/npp.htm.
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If the discloser can ascertain what data to reveal, it must next locate and assemble them.
But such information is often inaccessible or laborious to collect. For example, an Illinois statute
requires private business and vocational schools to state their enrollments and their student’s
graduation, licensing, placement, and employment rates and salaries.172 How many educational
institutions ordinarily keep all that information? Or get it even with much effort (not least
because much of it must come from former students)?
Some information is effectively too complex to assemble. For example, consumerdirected health-care information is endlessly intricate. Innumerable kinds of care might be
offered. Infinite permutations of reimbursement systems are possible. Plan organization is
endlessly variable. Quality is virtually impossible to measure. Costs are too complex and
dynamic to describe.
Assembling data is also hard where information is speculative. How does a biobank tell
people all the ways donations might be used decades into the future? How does a large-firm
lawyer anticipate the conflicts of interest that might develop over a lengthy representation?
Information must not only be collected, it must be monitored and updated. Disclosers
must hunt down changes and then repeat the travails of interpreting the law and assembling the
data. And in at least some areas the conventional wisdom is that disclosees need detailed
updates often. For example, Wendler and Rackoff argue that consent to participate in research
expires when significant changes have occurred in “(a) the nature of the research itself, as
determined by its purpose, risks, potential benefits, requirements, and alternatives; (b) the
person's personal and medical situations; and (c) the person's preferences and interests,” and that
elaborate reconsent then is necessary.173
3. Implementing the Mandate
Suppose the discloser can identify the information to be disclosed, can assemble it, and
now must present it. How? (Here we are discussing only disclosers’ problems in deciding how
to communicate information; we later discuss disclosees’ problems reading it.) This question has
looked easy to law-makers and commentators; but consider a relatively simple mandate –
Miranda. Two large recent surveys “yielded 945 distinct Miranda warnings from 638
jurisdictions that were augmented by research on 122 juvenile English warnings . . . and 121
general Spanish warnings . . . .” These warnings “range from 21 to 408 words with an average
of 95.60 words.”174 Further, “[r]emarkable differences in reading levels are observed across
Miranda warnings/waivers.” A fifth are written below a sixth-grade reading level, most require a
sixth to eighth grade level, and 2% “require at least some college education.”175
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One problem is that ambiguity is startlingly hard to avoid. Words are slippery. For
example, even “[a]bsolute terms when placed in a medical setting appear to be open to
interpretation. Only 80.3% agreed that ‘certain’ meant 100 of 100 people, and only 67.8%
agreed that ‘never’ meant zero of 100 people.”176 One study “found that physicians’
interpretations of the term ‘likely’ (with regard to risk probability) ranged from 25 to 75%, and
another study “reported that interpretations of the term ‘very likely’ ranged from 30 to 90%, even
when presented in a restricted medical context.”177
Numbers present similar puzzles for disclosers. For example, risks can be described as
either rates or proportions. Genetic counselors (presumably specialists in describing risks to the
naïve) have conventionally believed “that women understand proportions better than rates.” Yet
there is “no scientific evidence to support that convention.” On the contrary, in one study “more
than three times as many women judged risks correctly with rates alone, compared with only
proportions.” And “[m]any women did not understand either format.”178
Presumably responding to such problems, two law-makers – the European Union and the
UK Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency – proposed substituting words for
numbers. However, the EU’s terms “have been shown to lead to considerable overestimations of
risk by patients, doctors and the general public. For example, according to EU guidelines the
term ‘common’ is assigned to side effects that occur in 1–10% of people taking the medicine . . .
. [O]n average, patients interpreted the word to mean around 45%, while doctors estimated the
risk to be around 25%.” But “even the patients receiving information as percentages assessed the
risk as higher than the actual risk.”179 And these disasters came not from recalcitrant disclosers,
but from law-makers themselves.
Other problems abound, many too well known to require reiteration here. For instance,
the way a fact is framed notoriously affects perceptions of it. People react differently if a
treatment is said to have an 80% chance of success instead of a 20% chance of failure. Yet all
information comes in some kind of frame.180
4. Resisting the Mandate
We’ve argued that even disclosers striving to obey a mandate will encounter crippling
problems. But disclosers presumptively have reasons to disobey, since mandates are usually
imposed because law-makers think disclosers are deliberately withholding information. Some of
these reasons may be illegitimate. For example, some disclosures are mandated because
176
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disclosers are withholding discreditable information from consumers. And an enterprise that
unscrupulously withheld information before the mandate might do so afterwards.
Nevertheless, policy ought not be driven by stereotypes about evil and greedy nondisclosers. Many disclosers are none of these things, many disclosers have good reasons to
behave well, and many disclosers dutifully obey mandates.181 Furthermore, even scrupulous
disclosers may resist mandates for understandable, sensible, and even admirable reasons. For
example, a disclosure mandate is often one of many commands, incentives, and pressures.
Usually, disclosers’ primarily want to get their work done, and disclosure mandates can be
irrelevant to and even inconsistent with doing so. For example, doctors and hospitals face many
disclosure requirements, if only because they have so much information patients might want.182
But doctors and hospitals properly think their principal task is to cure illness and sooth suffering,
and that task alone wholly outstrips the time available for it. For example, a typical doctor has
insufficient time to provide just the preventive services the U.S. Preventive Services Task
recommends.183 And “current practice guidelines for only 10 chronic illnesses require more time
than primary care physicians have available for patient care overall.”184 Obviously mandated
disclosures are not the only desirable activity doctors must scant or forego.
Disclosers may also consider a mandate burdensome but ineffective and even harmful.
Disclosers may, for example, discover that a disclosure is costly but unread and unheeded.
Disclosers may also discover that no matter how precisely they speak, disclosees tend to give
more weight to data than the data merit. For example, no matter how side effects are revealed,
patients tend to over-estimate their importance. Doctors may plausibly believe that such overestimates discourage patients from complying with treatment instructions, and doctors know that
baseline noncompliance is astonishingly high (50% is a common estimate). Such doctors may
conclude that the risk of bad outcomes from noncompliance exceeds the risk of bad outcomes
from undisclosed side-effects. For example, in a French study “[o]nly 44% of the
rheumatologists regularly told their patients about possible serious side effects and only 7%
about life-threatening side effects.” However, “[i]Information about the adverse effects of not
taking prescribed drugs was given to patients ‘all the time’ to ‘fairly often’ by as many as 88% of
the rheumatologists.” The researchers thought that a “central concern among rheumatologists
may be that concern about side effects may cause poor compliance.”185
Disclosers also discover that the human situation they encounter is more complex than
the situation the law-maker anticipated. For example, disclosers who must deliver bad news are
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likely to want to soften it, and doctors and patients alike often believe that that is desirable.186
Thus cancer patients are even more optimistic about their prognoses than their optimistic doctors
partly because of “physician communication behaviors such as avoidance of discussing
prognosis, withholding prognostic information, or presenting overly optimistic information.”187
Disclosers that wish to resist a mandate have many options. Mandates can be ignored,
apparently even in quite conspicuous circumstances. For example, “EU Legislation passed
during the 1990s made it mandatory for drug packaging to contain a leaflet providing all the
information that is provided to health professional in the summary of product characteristics,
including all adverse effects, but in a form understandable to the patient.” However, in a recent
study 40% of the leaflets “gave no indication of the likelihood of any adverse effect.”188
When disclosers may choose their own disclosure language, they can usually beautify it.
When health plans had to reveal how their doctors were paid, “almost none” mentioned “the
potential negative impact that incentive arrangements might have on physician behavior.” They
more often painted “incentives in a positive light,” by saying, for example, that they rewarded
better care.189
Disclosers can also obey the letter of a mandate but not its spirit.190 A doctor may use an
informed-consent form rather than try to educate the patient. (One unit of the University of
Michigan hospital has a single statement for all its varied procedures that is thrust at the patient
just before the procedure.) An insurance company may have customers sign disclosure forms,
even when customers plainly do not read and cannot understand them. Mechanical compliance
is chronic when disclosers rely on agents. Indifferent agents notoriously deliver information like
automata, radiating boredom and impatience, urging disclosees to sign without reading,
intimating that disclosures are meaningless technicalities. The poster example is the title
company’s closing agent, the funnel for many mortgage, real estate, and safety disclosures. In
addition, disclosers can sometimes work outside the mandate’s technical reach. For example,
police may try to induce waivers of and question suspects “outside Miranda.”191 Similarly,
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lending disclosure requirements may “create incentives for lenders to draft contract terms that
evade current disclosure regulations and continue to obscure the actual contract terms.”192
Do such disclosers run risks? If like Holmes’ bad man they ask what “courts are likely to
do in fact,” they generally answer “not much.” Most nondisclosures injure nobody enough to
provoke litigation. For example, apparently few informed-consent suits are brought except as
pendants to malpractice suits, few are won, and damages are modest.
Disclosers may react to mandates in subtler ways. Consider our conflict-of-interest
example. Disclosure might “deter advisors from giving biased advice by increasing their
concern that estimators (now thought to be alerted by disclosure) will completely discount
extreme advice or attribute corrupt motives to advice that seems even remotely questionable. On
the other hand, advisors might be tempted to provide even more biased advice, exaggerating their
advice in order to counteract the diminished weight that they expect estimators to place on it . . .
.”193 Cain et al speculate that disclosure requirements give disclosers not only “strategic reason,”
but also “moral license,” to “exaggerate their advice.”194
Where the law-maker distrusts disclosers, it may try to dictate how information is
provided by, for example, specifying details of disclosure forms (like font size) and the precise
data to be disclosed (like serving sizes in nutrition-fact boxes). Such specifications can reach
ambitious proportions. For instance, some rent-to-own regulations require conspicuous
disclosures of as many as seventeen items, including aspects of the goods, payments, charges,
risk allocations, options, and more.195 Similarly, some jurisdictions require describing more than
thirty aspects of a used car’s condition.
In sum, even a willing discloser encounters many impediments to making useful
disclosures. For good reasons and bad, not all disclosers are willing, and reluctant disclosers
have many ways to resist the ideal disclosure the lawmaker originally envisioned.
5. An Illustrative Vignette
A vignette may help us review the problems disclosers encounter. The Jeanne Clery
Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act196 grew out of trouble
stories like the tragedy of a Lehigh student who was raped and murdered in her dorm.
The Clery Act requires roughly 6,600 institutions of higher education to publish an
“Annual Campus Security Report” for prospective and current students and employees that
192
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includes crime statistics for three years, policy statements, descriptions of crime-prevention
programs, and procedures for handling sex offenses. The Act makes schools keep a public log of
reported crimes and give warnings of crimes that are a threat to safety. The Department of
Education assures us that the Act “provides students and families, as higher education
consumers, with the information they need to make informed decisions.”197 The Department
warns that
[c]ompliance with the Clery Act is not simply a matter of entering statistics into a
Web site or publishing a brochure once a year. Compliance is a whole system of
developing policy statements, gathering information from all the required sources
and translating it into the appropriate categories, disseminating information, and,
finally, keeping records. Many people at your institution—from the president on
down—should be involved.198
So “[c]olleges spend a good deal of money putting out crime reports of questionable
value. How much the process costs, including percentages of staff salaries, is so hard to
calculate that even those who work on the reports could not guess how much. The Clery Act’s
complexity requires perpetual training, especially as amendments continue to change colleges’
reporting requirements.”199
Are Clery Act disclosees better informed? Crime statistics are notoriously unreliable
because defining a crime and determining its incidence are so hard. “Campus officers routinely
struggle with the crime classifications . . . . Nuances of a crime’s location are especially
confounding . . . .” How could these officers not struggle with regulations in which
“[a]ggravated assaults, for example, get counted by victim, but robberies – even of five people
by one perpetrator – should be counted by incident”? So one expert “fields five or six calls a
week from colleges that need help figuring out what to report. When she travels to institutions
for audits, she always turns up errors in the way they are counting crimes. ‘‘Not once,’ she says,
‘have I found a campus that’s completely in compliance.’”
If the Department of Education cannot write standards colleges can understand, if
colleges are confused about the rules and interpret them differently, even an expert cannot
understand their reports. And the intended audience is prospective and current students and
college employees, none of whom will have any idea of how crimes are reported and tallied and
of the interpretive problems colleges face. Furthermore, “reports include total crimes, not rates,”
so figures have little meaning unless readers somehow convert them to rates.
All this assumes the college is trying to comply with the law. But experts “suspect that
many institutions simply import numbers from the ‘Clery complaint’ software program sold to
police departments and send off their reports.” Worse, “some colleges may manipulate their
numbers.”
197
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Overall, then, the money colleges spend complying with the Clery Act – and pass on to
their students in much-deplored higher tuition – is simply wasted.200 Worse, the Act creates
perverse incentives. The more policing colleges do, and the more they encourage students to
report crimes, the likelier they are to uncover crimes to report. Thus virtuous colleges look
dangerous. Furthermore, the resources the Clery Act commandeers would be better spent
making colleges safer. Thus one criminologist called the Act’s reporting regulations “symbolic
politics" and said that greater safety is likelier to come from practices like blue-light telephones
and security cameras: “That's just one fix, he says, for a system that revolves around complex
annual reports, a huge investment with little return. ‘The focus,’ Mr. Sloan says, ‘ought to shift
from producing a bunch of statistics that are basically useless.’"
C. Disclosees
We now must make some heroic assumptions. The law-maker has accurately indentified
the information the consumer needs and has stated the mandate correctly and comprehensibly.
The discloser has read, understood, and obeyed the mandate, has assembled the required
information, and has disclosed it effectively. Ultimately, mandated disclosure’s success depends
on how much better disclosees make important, complex, and unfamiliar decisions when thus
given information. In this section, we argue that many practical factors conspire to keep
disclosees from using the information they are given profitably. More fundamentally, we argue
that mandated disclosure rests on the false assumptions that people want to make all the
consequential decisions about their lives and want to do so by assembling all the relevant
information, reviewing all the possible outcomes, reviewing all their relevant values, and
deciding which choice best promotes their preferences. These assumptions so poorly describe
how human beings live that mandated disclosure cannot reliably improve people’s decisions and
thus cannot be a dependable regulatory mechanism.
1. Disclosures and the World of Chris Consumer
Before we identify the individual factors that keep disclosees from using disclosures, we
present the “trump” card—the accumulation problem. People encounter too many disclosures to
be able to digest all of them. Our introduction to this problem is Chris—the poster child of the
disclosure paradigm—who reads all the disclosures he meets.
Chris starts his morning taking his daily medication, reading the mandated warnings and
disclosure of risks, and his daily vitamins, reading another set of mandated warnings. He plugs
in the toaster, after reading the sticker on the cord warning of electricity risks. Chris likes toast
with butter and jam but virtuously scrutinizes the label’s nutrition data and scrapes on a microlayer. He now has no time to read his newspaper and contents himself with the invoice for it,
with its full statement of itemized charges.
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This morning Chris’ car won’t start, so he calls a towing company, listens to prerecorded
statements, and sends for help. The driver presents the form that discloses the company’s
charges, policies, and insurance. Chris reads it carefully, signs, and directs the driver to the
repair shop. It gives Chris a detailed disclosure of its repair and pricing policies.
At the office, Chris skims sport scores on usatoday.com and the news on nytimes.com–
after reading the usatoday.com “terms of service (3350 words) and the nytimes.com “privacy
policy” (only 800 words). These are not directly mandated, but contract law requires that they
be prominent enough that the user can read them. True, he’s read these “browsewraps” before,
but they are modified occasionally, and blessed are the prudent.
The car shop calls to tell Chris the charges for parts and labor. This, for once, is
information Chris readily understands and really wants. The charges seem inflated, but Chris
can hardly tow the car to another shop. He grudgingly consents. He calls his bank to make a
balance transfer for his monthly credit card payment and is made to go online to complete an
electronic form and click to accept the terms (another legalese boilerplate he nobly reads).
Fedex arrives. Chris signs the form after reading the terms on the back. The package
contains documents from the property-insurance company the office has used for years. The
policy has changed somewhat, and Chris sedulously reads it.
Chris lunches with colleages at a bistro where a sign warns him about food that is not
overcooked. The menu warns him of the calories in each dish —thanks to a recent municipal
ordinance. Thus chastened, Chris eats cautiously. Still hungry after his unsatisfying breakfast
and lunch, Chris stops off for a 1000-calorie sundae (to which no disclosure law applies).
Returning, Chris passes a construction site where signs tell him about the building
project and how he can learn more. He makes a mental note to visit city hall and read the
additional information.
That afternoon, Chris goes for a flu shot. A two-page form recites the risks of the shot,
including Guillain-Barré Syndrome and death. He glooms through the form and signs.
Unfortunately, his one concern – a rumor that a version of the shot is “unsafe” – is not
discussed (as far as he can tell). Before leaving, Chris refills a prescription, after getting a form
stating that HIPAA requires the pharmacy to provide a notice “that describes how we may use
your information for treatment, payment and other purposes that details your rights regarding
the privacy of your health and medical information.” Chris pauses to parse the sentence, fails,
and turns to the notice (2,023 words).
Before dinner, Chris sits down to look through the papers he must read before deciding
whether to refinance his house. He starts on this project of thousands of words but soon drifts
into sleep. After dinner, Chris looks forward to Monday Night Football, but first he must buy a
wedding gift through an online gift registry, get tickets from an airline’s website, and register his
daughter for a soccer league. He opens an account in the registry website—a quick choice of
user ID and password and a slow read through terms and conditions before clicking “I
ACCEPT.” He also must accept the airline’s terms and so clicks on the link to the terms. Lastly

39
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art9

40

Ben-Shahar and Schneider:

he studies the soccer league’s disclosure on its rules and policies. He turns on the football
game—midway through the 3rd quarter—only to hear that “[t]his telecast is intended solely for
the private, non-commercial use of our audience. Any publication, reproduction, retransmission,
or any other use of the pictures, description, or accounts of this game without the express written
consent of . . . .” And so, to bed.
Thank heavens this is only a normal day in the life the law-makers have prescribed for
Chris. Many important decisions didn’t come up: choosing a credit card, getting a cell-phone
carrier, buying a car (and taking out a car loan), buying insurance, reviewing his health-plan,
purchasing pre-need burial services, and so endlessly on. Such decisions arise irregularly but
routinely, and they give Chris an even denser thicket of reading.
Truly, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, Chris was a saint. Was he free?
Was he happy? Did he enjoy a robust sense of autonomy? The question is absurd. Had anything
been wrong, we should certainly have heard. Of course the moral of Chris’s story hardly needs to
be drawn. Chris expended a remarkable part of his day reading disclosures he did not want,
could not understand, and did not use. He did have decisions to make, but he did not make them
better because of the disclosures. And the time he spent attending to mandated disclosures he
took away from things he needed to do, things he enjoyed doing, and decisions he was actually
interested in learning about. In other words, the mandated disclosure paradigm mistakenly asks
whether someone making a decision would be better off with more information. If that person
had nothing in life but that decision, perhaps the answer would be yes. But since information
that could be useful in a single-decision world becomes useless in the real world, the answer is
generally no.
With Chris’s sobering life in mind, let us return to our project of identifying all the
conditions that would need to be met for mandated disclosure to work. We now must ask what
disclosees must do if disclosures are to serve their purpose.
2. Acquiring Disclosed Information
Disclosees cannot use information until they acquire it. But consumers often don’t know
it exists, where it is, or how to find it, and they often doubt that they need it or that it would
justify its acquisition costs. And so the long path from law-maker to discloser to disclosee ends
because disclosees don’t know about or take up the proffered information. Literally or
metaphorically, all those Clery Act reports are on the floor and in the wastebasket.
For example, the updated credit-card agreement arrives. Why? Is its information new?
Relevant? Necessary? Or the tow truck comes. Do you know that the driver has information
about the towing service? Would that information lead you to dismiss that service and look for
one offering better terms?
People have many reasons not to seek out information. Many consumers do not know
how much the quality of goods and, especially, services varies. “[M]ost consumers do not
believe clinical quality varies significantly across doctors, hence the low consumer demand for
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clinical quality report cards.”201 For example, patients see LASIK (a kind of eye surgery) as a
commodity and shop for it only on the basis of price, when in fact quality differs considerably
across providers.202 Also confidence can lead people to over-estimate the adequacy of their
knowledge. So “investors often do not recognize how difficult these choices are and instead rely
on a belief that their innate abilities will lead to a good investment result.”203 And one “of the
most disconcerting findings” of a study of doctors’ attempts to educated patients about end-oflife care “was that patients expressed strong preferences about treatments that they did not
understand.”204
Even when people know they need information, they may not want it enough to labor to
acquire it. First, they must find the right document, and then the right place in the document.
(Try finding the water damage exclusion in your home owners insurance policy, or the privacy
policy in a credit-card contract.) Disclosure documents are notoriously long: HIPAA disclosures
easily run to six large pages of small type. IRBs can require consent forms of twenty pages. To
pile Pelion on Ossa, these documents are infamously a farrago of convoluted language,
serpentine sentences, tiny print, and irrelevancies.205
With all these barriers to acquiring information, no wonder, for example, that while
people widely think the quality of care is the most important factor in choosing a health plan,
hardly any patients review the data disclosed under mandates from Quality Report Cards statutes.
Indeed, less than 1% of patients surveyed knew the rating of their hospital or surgeon.206
3. Understanding the Information
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Now suppose disclosees locate information, recognize its relevance and importance, and
try to understand it. Many will fail.
a. Illiteracy and Innumeracy
Illiteracy prevents many people from understanding much disclosed information.
Illiteracy can mean several things: Not knowing what word a combination of letters represents.
Not knowing what a word means. Not knowing what words combined in a sentence mean. Not
knowing how to extract information from a combination of several sentences. Well over 40
million adults are functionally illiterate, “and another 50 million have marginal literacy skills.”207
Eighty percent of the population cannot understand the definition of “peremptory challenge”
used to educate prospective jurors.208 Sector-specific illiteracy – like health or financial literacy –
is common. Four out of ten patients could not “comprehend directions for taking medication on
an empty stomach.”209 Many patients do not understand common clinical terms like “acute,”
“stable,” and “progressive.”210
Rates of innumeracy are even worse than rates of illiteracy. A standard test of numeracy
asks people how often a flipped coin comes up heads in 1,000 tries, what 1% of 1,000 is, and to
turn a proportion (1 in 1000) into a percentage. Thirty percent of women of above-average
literacy “had 0 correct answers, 28% had 1 correct answer, 26% had 2 correct answers, and 16%
had 3 correct answers.”211 Most of the people in another study had at least some college
education, but 40% “could not solve a basic probability problem or convert a percentage to a
proportion.”212 No wonder that “[a]fter receiving quantitative risk reduction data about the
benefit of mammography, most women did not apply this information correctly when asked to
estimate their risk for death from breast cancer with and without mammography.”213
Furthermore, mandated disclosures are regularly written at forbidding reading levels.
Financial-privacy notices are written at a third- or fourth-year college reading level.214 Twothirds of the privacy forms academic medical centers use require some college education, and
almost all (90%) are “difficult.” Practically all the Quality Report Cards given patients use
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indicators patients do not understand.215 HIPAA authorization forms add two pages to informed
consent materials and are in language “similar in complexity to that in corporate annual reports,
legal contracts, and the professional medical literature.”216 And only 3-4% of the population can
understand the language in which contracts are drafted.217
Even lawyers of the utmost sophistication retire defeated. During oral argument before
the New Jersey Supreme Court, Chief Justice Weintraub said of an insurance policy, “I don't
know what it means. I am stumped. They say one thing in big type and in small type they take it
away.” Justice Haneman admitted that he couldn’t “understand half of my insurance policies.”
Justice Francis got “the impression that insurance companies keep the language of their policies
deliberately obscure.”218 Credit card contracts, subject to mandated disclosures, are no better. As
Elizabeth Warren said of one, “I teach contract law at Harvard, and I can’t understand half of
what it says.”219
The standard response to these facts is to advocate simpler forms. But experts have
labored intelligently and earnestly for decades to present complex information accessibly, and it
is now clear that disappointingly little progress is possible. For example, one sophisticated
attempt at a simple guide for prostate-cancer patients had “a readability score of 7th grade,”
which would exclude roughly half the population.220 A recent study of mutual-fund disclosures
is to like effect.221 And there is a reason for this failure: complexity cannot be explained simply.
Sophisticated vocabularies and professional languages encapsulate complex thoughts. If only
simple words can be used, everything must be lengthily spelled out. This returns us to the
overload problem. Many words, even if simple, make forms repellently long and cognitively
overwhelming.222 Thus one effort “to come up with a ‘simplified’ Miranda warning backfired
when several Miranda components were included in a 32-word sentence.”223
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Consider one of the plainer contracts drafted in lay language – eBay’s User Agreement,
which affects millions of people.224 The easy-to-understand terms are those people already
know, without reading the agreement, like the “fees and services” provision. But in sticky areas
– those that might provoke problems – even the lay language is confusing. Like this: “when
you give us content, you grant us a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, irrevocable, royaltyfree, sublicensable (through multiple tiers) right to exercise the copyright, publicity, and database
rights (but no other rights) you have in the content, in any media known now or in the future.” In
this syntactical tangle, ten adjectival terms come between the article (“a”) and the noun (“right”).
The terms mean little until you reach “right” and find out what they are modifying. Almost all
the sentence’s terms require special knowledge. “Content,” “non-exclusive,” “perpetual,”
“irrevocable,” “royalty-free,” “sublicensable,” “tiers,” “copyright,” “publicity,” “database,”
“rights,” and “media” are terms people don’t use in the contract’s sense, if at all.
What if disclosures were spoken, not written? At best, this would only partly solve the
literacy problem (and probably exacerbate the numeracy problem). Extracting information from
speech is like listening to a foreign language you know moderately well. At first you think you
understand; you hear a word you don’t instantly recognize; you pause to identify it; you return to
find the speaker several words along in the sentence and you struggle to catch up. Soon it’s
hopeless. Reading at least lets you choose your pace and reread puzzling passages. And many
disclosures are far too long to state orally.
Oral disclosures can reduce comprehension in other ways. Disclosees are often under
stress, insecure, anxious, and rushed. Such people cannot take in what they are told and to use it
effectively. For example, one paramedic being told she had cancer “was in a bubble. I saw his
mouth moving and I was aware of a flow of words, but I was unable to process most of the
information. He might as well have been speaking a different language.”225 Even Yale faculty
and students who had been practicing civil disobedience and who were interviewed in their own
homes by relatively mild law-enforcement officials were nervous and discomfited.226
The evidence about oral disclosures confirms its limited usefulness. For example,
patients may need to know about end-of-life care, particularly cardiopulmonary resuscitation,
since CPR is less effective and more unpleasant than popularly supposed. Unfortunately,
doctors’ conversations with patients about medical decisions at the end of life are rare and
unsuccessful. In one study, discussions “did not usually concern specifics of treatment, such as
artificial ventilation or cardiopulmonary resuscitation, but rather tended to deal with generalities
and avoided details.”227 A study of how experienced clinicians discussed advance directives with
patients whom they know well found median conversations lasting 5.6 minutes and little
enlightening: “Physicians used vague language to describe scenarios, asking what patients
would want if they became ‘very, very sick’ or ‘had something that was very serious.’ They
224
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rarely attempted to define vague situations or to ascertain the meaning of such terms . . . .”
Further, “qualitative terms were used loosely to describe outcome probabilities.” These brief
conversations scanted “the more common, less clear-cut predicaments surrounding end-of-life
care.”228 Even patients told about “mechanical ventilation had a poor understanding of what this
procedure entails, and a significant number harbored important misconceptions.”229 If such
discussions of such issues with such people leave disclosees so ignorant, what hope for the
average run of disclosures.
Furthermore, the best-informed speakers are also busy and expensive. So doctors tell
nurses to “consent” the patient, or use substitutes like videotapes, instead of having the careful
discussion advocates of informed consent envision. Corporations shift communication to
automation and spoken formulas. This can mean an operator reading (slowly, wearily, and
uncomprehendingly) terms drafted by lawyers. As Judge Easterbrook said sardonically, “if the
staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales operations had to read the four-page statement
of terms before taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice would anesthetize rather
than enlighten many potential buyers.”230
Finally, disclosure mandates are often aimed at people who may be particularly
disadvantaged in trying to understand them. For example, sicker patients are considerably more
vulnerable to the complexities of informed consent than healthier patients.”231
b. Making Sense of Information
Illiteracy is not the only impediment to understanding disclosures. Simply understanding
disclosures of the kind that are commonly mandated takes intelligence, sometimes a good deal of
it, especially when misunderstanding even a single datum can badly mislead the disclosee. “High
intelligence is a useful tool in any life domain, but especially when tasks are novel, untutored, or
complex and situations are ambiguous, changing, or unpredictable.”232 Yet in areas in which
mandated disclosure is likeliest to be used, full and accurate understanding is vanishingly rare.
What is more, there is little reason to suppose that people can regularly be brought to do so.233
When people receive information, they rarely record the data in their minds exactly as
they received them. Rather, they need to interpret the data as they receive it, to try to make sense
of it. This means that people interpret data by putting it in the framework of their current
228
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understanding. When people make decisions in their ordinary lives, their “understanding of the
rapid flow of continuing social events . . . [depends] on a rich store of general knowledge of
objects, people, events, and their characteristic relationships." Some of this knowledge may be
represented as beliefs or theories, that is, reasonably explicit propositions about the
characteristics of objects or object classes. People use these theories for organizing and
explaining the information they receive. 234 In short, people can misunderstand mandated
disclosures because they lack necessary background information, because they misunderstand
background information, and because they have no theories or have only the wrong theories for
interpreting what they are told.
For example, patients misunderstand medical information because they don’t know what
their organs do, where they are, or even what they are called.235 Patients interpret information
about CPR in light of the misleading picture they get from television shows.236 Similarly, few
people applying for mortgages know what amortization is and how it conventionally works in
paying off mortgages, which makes even lucid descriptions of balloon payments and fluctuating
interest rates mysterious. In fact, many borrowers think the “amount financed” disclosed in the
TILA statement is the loan amount, not the loan minus prepaid finance charges; or that the
“discount fee” in the Good Faith Estimate is a discount they receive, not a fee they are
charged.237
Likewise, few people understand even the basics of the market for health care.238 This
means, at best, that consumers generally lack, as Sage writes, “baseline information that could
provide context for required disclosure. Therefore, health care consumers can easily misinterpret
even accurate data.”239 In one study, for example, prospective health-plan enrollees thought high
hospitalization rates for pneumonia showed leniency in approving inpatient treatment rather than
a failure to administer vaccinations.240 Similarly, the Yale faculty and students who waived their
Miranda rights knew they could refuse to answer but did not know the practical consequences of
waiving those rights. “Their waiver of the right to a lawyer's advice was even less informed,
234
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since their ignorance of the significance of the right to silence was compounded by their
ignorance of the functions a lawyer might have performed for them.”241
4. Remembering the Information
Receiving and analyzing information about complex and unfamiliar subjects take time,
which means disclosees must remember what they have been told. But memory is fallible.
Studies of informed consent, for example, repeatedly find that people correctly remember about
a third of what of the basic information they are given if asked open-ended questions and about
half if asked multiple-choice questions. Worse, people misremember what they are told.
All this is inevitable. Even in the best of circumstances it is hard to remember what you
have learned without work. But information is especially hard to remember if you are not
familiar with a subject. That is, things are most easily remembered if you can place them in
some kind of context, a template, or a story. Thus jurors do reasonably well at remembering the
facts of a case (and at helping each other remember the facts) but do quite badly at remembering
the judge’s instructions about the law.242 As the jurors hear the facts, they put them in the
framework of a story. The law is a set of rules which do not fit in a story and for which jurors
have no template.
Furthermore, people are better at remembering pleasant thoughts than unpleasant ones.
Information contained in mandated disclosures is often stark and pessimistic, dealing with things
that can go wrong and with contingent problems. For example, “Retention of information is
selective and the expected benefits of surgery are recalled much better than the potential
risks.”243 This is not the place to explore all the reasons for such selective memory. It might have
to do with cognitive biases, or it may reflect defense mechanisms such as suppression or denial.
One implication, however, is that such factors may contribute to physicians’ tendency to avoid
discussing prognoses, withhold prognostic information, or present overly optimistic
information.244
5. Analyzing the Information in Decision-Making
Mandated disclosure attempts to solve social problems by requiring the disclosure of
information. We have now looked at the likelihood that the disclosee will receive, understand,
and remember the information whose disclosure is mandated. We have seen that each of these is
so problematic that often the disclosee will not encounter the information, will not try to
assimilate it, will not read or hear it correctly, will not understand it, or will misunderstand. The
whole point of mandated disclosure is to provide people with good information. If they do not
take up the information and learn it accurately, mandated disclosure fails.
241
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We might well end our discussion of mandated disclosure here. But mandated disclosure
has another fault. It addresses a large problem with a partial remedy. People make bad decisions
not just because they lack information. They also make bad decisions because they cannot use
the information they have well. This problem mandated disclosure does not solve. And
particularly in the kinds of areas to which mandated disclosure is directed, people can have
considerable – even disabling – difficulties making good decisions.
A vast and growing literature in social psychology and behavioral economics has now begun to
catalog the ways in which people distort information and ignore and misuse it in making
decisions. We don’t need to chaperone our readers through this literature to get from it one of its
crucial insights: you do not solve the problem of bad decisions just by giving people information.
It may be a necessary condition; it is not a sufficient one. The whole exercise of mandating
disclosure to give people information is useless if the information does not lead people to make
better decisions. We have concentrated on disclosees’ cognitive problems with disclosed
information and argued that those cognitive problems are generally so great that people often
lack an adequate command of the information they need to make good decisions. But even if
disclosees were offered, accepted, understood, and remembered all the information relevant to a
decision, they would still be likely to encounter such serious difficulties in using the information
to make a good decision that the information will do them little good. To put the point
differently, mandated disclosure is fundamentally misconceived because its solution to the
problem of choice is information alone, but people’s problems with their choices go well beyond
informational insufficiency. In the remainder of the section, we will discuss several problem
people have in analyzing the information and using it to make decisions.
a. Calculating
We have already said that complex information in large quantities makes it hard for
disclosees to acquire and understand disclosures. The problem worsens when disclosees try to
use such information to make good decisions. People can keep only a few factors in mind when
analyzing a problem. A “large body of empirical work suggest[s] that the integration of different
types of information and values into a decision is a very difficult cognitive process. Evidence
shows that people can process and use only a limited number of variables.”245 In fact, further
information may decrease the reliability of people’s decisions: “That is, when individuals had
more information, their ability to use it ‘consistently’ declined.” In one study, for instance,
Slovic asked expert handicappers to predict horse races. The more information the handicappers
had, the more confident they were, but their predictive ability was as good with 5 variables as
with 10, 20, or 40.” Worse, “reliability of the choices decreased as more information was made
available.”246
It is not surprising, then, that consumers borrow more than is rational. The calculations
required to borrow shrewdly are many and knotty. They involve comparing relative costs of
credit and cash, comparing different financial products such as short versus long term or secured
245
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versus unsecured, setting the proper level of saving versus consumption, factoring in the time
value of money and how it might evolve, and according each factor some relative weight. In the
face of all this complexity, it is hard not to overweight a few simple, easily understood factors
like low present interest rates.
Indeed, confronted with unfamiliar and complicated choices, people often seek to
simplify the task by pruning away the factors they consider, and at the extreme they consult a
single factor. “Making trade-offs to integrate conflicting dimensions into an overall choice is
such a complex cognitive task that people tend to use heuristic shortcuts that may not produce
optimal decisions. These simplified strategies include selecting only one dimension and ignoring
others or focusing on concrete, easy to understand concepts such as cost rather than more
complicated and less precise factors such as quality indicators.”247 The more overwhelming a
decision, the better radical shortcuts look.248
So (perhaps because of the anchoring heuristic) the rule for borrowing seems to be: Can I
afford the monthly payment? This requires minimal calculation, but it also distorts the cost of
credit. It obscures comparisons between the cost of credit and the cost of paying for a household
purchase out of savings and comparison of competing credit offers. Most importantly, it renders
disclosure of APR and related credit terms interesting but irrelevant.
Another example. Choices for treating treat breast cancer are – as these things go –
relatively simple, specialists have much experience presenting those choices to patients, and
much attention has been paid to how to do so. Still, one study concluded that the leading
“influence on decision-making behavior” was “perceived salience.” In other words, patients let
one aspect of the treatment determine the decision. These patients “did not report conflict about
what course to take or the need for further information or deliberation.”249 And indeed breastcancer patients seem regularly to choose a treatment with nothing approaching adequate
understanding of their choices.”250
Finally, even employers’ specialists choose health plans crudely. Only about a fifth used
“some kind of system for making trade-offs and identifying high-performing, cost-effective
plans,” and the “system” could be as primitive as a four-cell matrix. “Twelve percent reported
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that they made their choices on the basis of a single dimension such as cost or geographic
access.”251
b. Choosing
disclosure is not mandated to give disclosees a cognitive workout; its purpose is to help them
make good decisions. Disclosure will be pointless, if people can understand the information they
are given but are kept by other problems in handling information from resolving questions more
successfully.
The mandated-disclosure formula assumes that disclosees take the information they are
provided and use it to work out which choice best serves their preferences. However, when
people consider subjects as to which they lack well-developed preferences, that lack can make it
hard for them to use disclosed information productively. For example, someone considering
insurance against a peril usually knows little about the coverage sought. The person might come
to understand the risks, probabilities, and deductibles but be unsure which package of policy
limits, exclusions, deductibles, and premia is preferable. Of course more coverage, fewer
exclusions, smaller deductions, and cheaper premia are better. But would someone unused to
trading off these factors know how to weigh them?
Or a patient with a possibly fatal disease must choose between a treatment with a
relatively low chance of success but a low risk of death and other serious side effects and a
treatment with a high chance of success but a high risk of death and other serious side effects.
Patients have preferences that are relevant here – they want to avoid death and to avoid side
effects. But few patients have values that will help them beyond this.
We are, of course, not arguing that people generally don’t know their preferences. Our
(narrower) argument is that few people can (or want to) develop finely calibrated preferences in
the often-technical mandated-disclosure areas quickly and accurately enough to use in making
decisions. Few have the ability to identify the fine distinctions about their own preferences and
the tradeoffs among them in those technical areas that are subject to many of the disclosure
mandates.
Another requirement for using disclosed information is making two kinds of predictions
– predicting how you will react to your choice and how you will feel about your choice once you
have started living it. A considerable and bemusing literature reveals that both predictions are
hazardous. Even in some familiar situations people mispredict their behavior.252 They go on
dates planning to behave chastely, engage in foreplay expecting to use a condom, and initiate sex
planning to stop before the critical moment. 253 In less familiar situations, the problem intensifies.
For example, many credit card users wrongly expect to maintain a zero credit balance. Or,
251

Judith H. Hibbard et al, Choosing a Health Plan: Do Large Employers Use the Data?, 16 Health
Affairs 172, 177 (1997).
252
See, generally, Oren Bar-Gill, Informing Consumers about Themselves (NYU Working Paper, 2007).
253
On such mispredictions, see, e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some
Problems in the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in Joseph P. Forgas, ed, Feeling and Thinking:
The Role of Affect in Social Cognition 178–197 (Cambridge U Press, 2000).

50
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010

51

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 9 [2010]

consumers joining health clubs at the flat rate option often chose incorrectly, overestimating their
future usage by more than 100 percent.254
People’s ability to use mandated disclosures effectively can be compromised by, for
example, a tendency to overestimate how unhappy a bad outcome will make them and to
underestimate their ability to diminish that unhappiness. So people react to disease and disability
less despairingly than they expect.255 The sick generally evaluate their lives differently from the
way the well evaluate them,256 and despite the “quality of life is more important than quantity”
mantra, many patients would yield much quality even for slightly more quantity.257
c. Expertise
In most of the situations in which disclosure is mandated, more than facts are needed.
Expertise – accumulated knowledge and experience – is also needed. The experts with whom
disclosees deal – bankers, doctors, police, businesses, and so on – have a comparable kind of
experience in their area of expertise, and that experience allows them to make better decisions in
their area than a novice. As experts accumulate experience, they develop sets of patterns in their
minds. These patterns describe the way things in their area usually work. When experts with
this kind of experience encounter a new problem, they can consult their file of patterns to see
what is recognizable in the problem and in the solution. In other words, "As a practitioner
experiences many variations of a small number of types of cases, he is able to ‘practice’ his
practice. He develops a repertoire of expectations, images, and techniques. He learns what to
look for and how to respond to what he finds."258 More precisely, “Decision makers recognize
the situation as typical and familiar . . . They understand what types of goals make sense (so the
priorities are set), which cures are important (so there is not an overload of information), what to
expect next (so they can prepare themselves and notice surprises), and the typical ways of
responding in a given situation. By recognizing a situation as typical, they also recognize a
course of action likely to succeed.”259
This kind of experience and skill in making particular kinds of decisions is developed by
practice and cannot be taught simply by providing information. Reaching a good decision is not
an exercise in analytical logic or an application of a simple theory. Rather, a good decision
254
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results from technical experience and savvy, gained by practice, trial-and-error, and some
measure of intuition—factors that cannot be passes along by simple communication. It is based
on knowledge that is implicit, rather than articulate.260 Indeed, experts “usually know more than
they can say. They exhibit a kind of knowing-in-practice, most of which is tacit."261 This tacit
knowledge has also been described as a kind of “[i]ntuition [that] depends on the use of
experience to recognize key patterns that indicate the dynamics of the situation.”262
This is of course not to say that novices can never understand information. But novices’
lack of expertise places on them another burden in interpreting disclosures. In the areas in which
mandated disclosure is most used, operates, novices cannot easily understand the facts they are
given, how to put them in context, how to analyze them, and how to act on them. To be sure, the
range of expertise called for in the areas regulated by mandated disclosure is great. But when
one surveys, for example, the list of disclosers described in the fourth paragraph of this article,
one realizes that most of them need a good deal of experience to understand their work and the
choices they present to their clients.
This brings us back to the quantity question. We have just suggested that experts deal
with it in ways that are not available to novices. For example, by long experience they build up
sets of patterns they can consult almost intuitively. They build up standard solutions to problems.
Like seasoned watchmakers, they break down complex problems into sub-problems, reducing
the complexity. In short, experts find ways to simplify choices so that they make them with as
few data and as little labor as possible.
d. Decision Aversion
Mandated disclosure assumes that people want to make decisions themselves, and that
they do so by gathering and evaluating information about their choices. In areas subject to
mandated disclosure, both parts of this assumption are unreliable. The empirical evidence shows
that people resist making even crucial decisions, and that when they do make decisions they do
with little information and scant reflection on it. For example, people numerously resist making
their own medical decisions, and the sicker and older they are – and thus the more consequential
their decisions – the more they resist. In one study, asked if they wanted information, patients’
mean score was 80 on a 0 - 100 scale; asked if they wanted to make their own decisions, the
mean score was 33.263
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Similarly, people avoid financial decisions and use less information than they need and
could get. For example, people famously avoid rational retirement planning.264 “Only 42
percent of workers report they and/or their spouse have tried to calculate how much money they
will need to have saved.”265 Rather than choosing investments, employees often leave pension
money wherever their employer puts it.266 Despite easily available advice about the basics of
retirement planning, employees hold employer stock in risky proportions.267
Of course many people make many decisions willingly and well. Many decisions are
normally made personally (like choosing a school or a spouse). Some decisions some people
enjoy making (like buying shotguns or shoes). And acquiring information can be fun (like
reading box scores or gossip columns). But decisions—especially the subset of decisions
mandated disclosure seeks to improve—are generally a means, not an end, a distraction, not a
pleasure. The drudgery of learning, the agony of indecision, the risks of responsibility, the
inevitability of incompetence, the recognition of perils, are avoided.
Seeking plenary control can interfere with the things that really matter to you. Control
means constantly making choices, which is time-sapping and soul-sucking. As Whitehead
wonderfully said, “It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by copy-books and by eminent
people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking about what
we are doing. . . . Operations of thought are like cavalry charges in a battle: they are strictly
limited in number, they require fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive moments.”268
Not only may people resist making the kinds of decisions mandated disclosure addresses,
they also resist making them in the way mandated disclosure intends. For most people facing
such decisions, the more-is-better mantra is wrong. In many areas, and particularly where people
are confused and need “protection,” knowledge is not intrinsically valued. People can want to
know less, not more. They can find information a burden, not a privilege. They begrudge the
time and effort it takes to learn and use the amount and kind of information mandated-disclosure
provides. They don’t like to read contracts, manuals, warnings, notices, forms, charts,
instructions, or to burrow through endless data. An extreme example is the finding that sixty
percent of criminal suspects did not go to the labor of understanding and using their Miranda
rights partly because they hoped “that they could go home if they ‘cooperated’ with the
interrogation and confessed.”269
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Yet everywhere people turn, they are bombarded with excess information. So they try to
stem the waste of time and attention required to sort through the information. Google triumphs
because it gives people less information – the useful information, the “top hits” – not more.
They become, in short, numb to information delivered in mandated disclosures.
Instead, people look for cues, signals, something familiar to latch onto—indicators that
are largely inconsistent with the comprehensive, systematic information toward which
disclosures tend. People hope to make decisions with less information, not more; to break the
information down to easy, modular, pieces, not to assemble it to comprehensive wholes; to
minimize exposure to unknown decisions and replace them with familiar ones. The ideal
underlying mandated disclosure—provision of more systematic information—flouts these
preferences.

IV. SOME UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE
We have examined the potential of mandated disclosure to inform people and improve
their decisions. But disclosures can affect transactions and interactions in other ways, by creating
indirect benefits and imposing selective costs. In this section, we first look at some possible
indirect benefits of mandated disclosure and then examine some indirect and unintended costs.
A. Indirect Benefits of Mandated Disclosure
Mandated disclosure’s core purpose is to supply the information people need to make
better decisions. We have just described a long series of requirements that would have to be met
for mandated disclosure to serve that purpose, and we argued that these requirements would
rarely all be met. If a mandated-disclosure regulation fails to accomplish its purpose, it cannot
be justified even if its cost is small.
But might mandated disclosure be justified on the basis of indirect benefits that have so
far been overlooked? First, might mandated disclosure serve some goals other than directly
informing people? Second, might mandated disclosure be made to work more effectively?
1. An “Agency” Benefit
An influential law-and-economics argument maintains that a few sophisticated readers of
disclosures can discipline disclosers and force them to offer better term, eschew hidden traps,
and behave efficiently.270 Mandated disclosure can be regarded as a way to inform these
sophisticated readers, whose presence would benefit all disclosees. We doubt, however, that
sophisticated disclosees are “reading agents” for other disclosees.
First, this theory conflicts with the premise of mandatory disclosure. The sophisticated
readers are supposed to induce businesses voluntarily to disclose information and avoid self270
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serving behavior. That is, recognizing the presence of sophisticated consumers and seeking to
please them, businesses voluntarily disclose information and make it useful. Failure to do so
would either drive the sophisticates away or reduce their willingness to pay. Mandated
disclosure, by contrast, assumes that without a mandate, there will be no disclosure. It thus
assumes that there are not enough sophisticated consumers who know to demand and are able to
scrutinize the information. And this assumption is ordinarily correct. The factors that discourage
disclosees from scrutinizing disclosures apply to even sophisticated disclosees. If nobody reads
disclosures, it matters not that some non-readers are sophisticated.
Even if there were enough readers, they cannot be good agents for other consumers
unless they are reasonably typical. But the eccentric with the time, knowledge, skill, and
determination to plow through these documents is anything but typical. Furthermore, businesses
can try to identify and segregate these readers, so that the benefits they know to insist on will not
leak to the non-reading majority. Sophisticated readers could selectively enjoy the "good" terms
in the contract because they are buried in the fine print and take some digging to find. And even
if agency readers were subject to the same oppressive terms as everybody else, they might
negotiate ad hoc accommodations.271 That is, the agency account works only for a market in
which disclosers cannot distinguish readers from nonreaders and must give all consumers the
better deal readers insist on. But disclosure is often mandated where these conditions are not
met, as in medical situations (like informed consent), Miranda situations, and in warnings about
products – product-liability law, cigarette warnings, etc. – all areas in which different people use
or enjoy the information differently.
There are market entities who specialize in reading disclosures. Consumer watch dogs
and groups whose agenda is to assess complex products and disseminate the information to the
general public could serve as reading agents. Thus, mandated disclosures might inform these
market intermediaries who, in turn, might disseminate the information to the population. But it is
not clear that mandated disclosures help such groups fulfill their mission. Like other
sophisticated readers, they can and do get the information even if it were not mandated.
Moreover, it is not clear that information they provide is based on the content of disclosures.
Instead, it is often based on feedbacks and test trials which the watch dogs conduct. Finally, it is
not clear that the information disseminated by such entities is more accessible to consumers than
the disclosures themselves.
2. An Educational Benefit
Could mandated disclosure be salvaged if it used better educational techniques? As Kapp
writes, informed consent’s champions place “much faith . . . in the potential effectiveness of
various educational tools to empower patients to comprehend and manage adequately the basic
information needed to satisfy informed consent aspirations.” These tools include “more
sophisticated decision aids in the form of information technology; the provision of written
handouts to patients; presentation of information in qualitative, quantitative, and graphic formats,
271
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simplified to reach the lower literate patient; and the showing of videotapes.”272 It is said that
mandated disclosure could work if supported by more general attempts to educate people about
the area in which they must make decisions. Chairman Bernanke is one of many who believe
that financial education is a critical component of a robust and effective financial marketplace. It
is also said that while mandated disclosure may not directly improve people’s decisions, it helps
educate them about problems they may face.
Tocqueville thought “one of the most remarkable features of America” was the “universal
and sincere faith that they profess here in the efficaciousness of education.”273 Attempts to make
mandated disclosure work through education have consistently disappointed that faith. For
example, efforts to educate workers about 401(k) retirement savings regularly fail. Only about
15% of the people who leave investment seminars planning to change their investments actually
do so.274 One study even suggests that high school students who have taken a financial education
course score less well than other students.275 Similarly, considerable “evidence indicates that
early efforts to educate consumers [of health-care plans] have not been very effective...”276
Lubalin and Harris-Kojetin hope that “[w]ith appropriate education, over time consumers may
begin to understand the role that plan structure plays relative to doctor performance in affecting
their care and plan experiences.”277 But researchers have long striven to create that appropriate
education with dismal results.278
Education presents much the same problems that make mandated disclosure so
problematic. And when education is intended for general purposes and not to help someone with
a particular decision it is likely to work even less well. The problems of mandated disclosure as
education are not just cognitive and not just difficulties of time and attention, although they are
importantly all these things. The problems also arise because behavior is affected by so many
things that do not respond well to one-size-fits-all education.

272

Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care: Informed Consent
and Informed Choice, II Journal of Health & Biomedical Law 1, 13-14 (2006).
273
Quoted in A. Bartlett Giamatti, A Free and Ordered Space: The Real World of the University 33
(Norton 1988).
274
James J. Choi, et al, Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, and the Path
of Least Resistance, in 16 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, 67 -113, (James Poterba, ed., 2002); Colleen
E. Medill, Challenging the Four “Truths” of Personal Social Security Accounts: Evidence from the
World of 401(k) Plans, 81 N. Carolina L. Rev 901 (2003).
275
276

Cunningham et al, 20 Health Affairs at 165.
Lubalin and Harris-Kojetin, 56 Medical Care Research & Review at 73
278
A chastening perspective on education and mandated disclosure comes from continuing medical
education (CME). Despite many reasons to expect CME to work, its record is discouraging, and it
delivers “messages in ways that are most often ineffective.” Karen Tu & Dave Davis, Can We Alter
Physician Behavior by Educational Methods? Lessons Learned from Studies of the Management and
Follow-Up of Hypertension, 22 Journal of Continuing Education in the Health Professions 11, 20 (2002).
And despite the ineffectiveness of didactic CME, “[t]here is clear evidence that CME offerings today in
North America consist mostly of the less effective change strategies such as conferences.” Dave Davis,
Does CME Work? An Analysis of the Effect of Educational Activities on Physician Performance or
Health Care Outcomes, 28 International Journal of Psychiatry in Medicine 21, 31 (1998).
277

56
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010

57

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 9 [2010]

Smoking is a particularly clear example of the unexpected complexity and difficulty of
public education. Smoking rates are much lower. But is it because of warnings on cigarette
packaging? Surely change comes principally from more fundamental policies that changed
social attitudes, mobilized social pressures, and affected prices. These include laws driving
smokers from the company of their fellows; higher sales taxes; and bans in places like offices,
hotels, airplanes, and restaurants. The increasingly medical and social recognition of the
mortality and morbidity smoking causes has also been central. Educational efforts were
correlated with these changes, but it is not clear how much they caused them. And it is even less
clear that the mandated labeling has had any role in driving the educational campaign.
Finally, and perhaps most sobering, is the accumulation problem—yet again. Even if
consumers could be adequately educated in one area, they cannot begin to master the many areas
in which they must act. Consumers must do more than just buy goods and services intelligently.
For example, defined-contribution pensions oblige us to manage retirement accounts. Other
financial issues proliferate, like handling debt. “Education” is the magic solution invoked in
almost every area of mandated disclosure. People have to be educated about financial decisions,
health insurance choices, pensions, health care and sickness prevention, privacy protection,
internet shopping, eating habits and nutrition, risk management, smoking, gambling, and a long
and growing list of other issues related to physical and financial health and safety.
B. The Costs of Mandated Disclosure
It is no easier to measure the costs of mandated disclosure than its benefits. But there are
several reasons to believe that those costs can be considerable. We first discuss some direct
implementation costs, and then examine a variety of indirect, more subtle costs, that are often
unrecognized and unintended by law-makers.
1. Implementation Costs
In Part III, we charted all the things law-makers, disclosers, and disclosees must do for
mandated disclosure to succeed. We did so to show why mandated disclosure so often fails, but
many of these arguments can be understood as a catalog of the implementation costs of
mandated disclosure. For example, disclosers may be put to some expense in figuring out what
disclosures are actually mandated, as the rise of industries intended to tell disclosers their
obligations under HIPAA, the Clery Act, and so on suggests. TILA regulations became so
complicated that even expert counsel could prove inadequate. Issuers of securities always consult
specialized legal counsel.
In addition, we canvassed disclosers’ costs of assembling and providing information.
Costs can be especially great when information has not previously been assembled. Providing
information can be expensive if it has to be mailed, and particularly if it has to be mailed
regularly, as, for example, some financial privacy statements must be. Often disclosers must
fund bureaucracies to comply with disclosure mandates. It cost the Johns Hopkins Hospital
$114,528 to establish its PSDA program, and it “incurs on-going incremental costs including
document copying, file folders, audits, and personnel. It also has on-going total costs including
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continued training and physician education regarding advance directives.”279 And that hospital is
only one of thousands of institutions subject to the PSDA.
A much larger and growing bureaucracy administers the IRB system, whose principal
function is to supervise the researchers’ disclosures to prospective subjects. IRBs now have
professional staffs,280 but the principal personnel cost is the time IRB members – who are
primarily physicians, scientists, and other expensive people – spend reviewing, discussing, and
monitoring researchers’ disclosures. And IRBs can be so populous that “[m]any social sciences
and humanities departments are smaller than the IRB committee . . . .”281 Researchers are also
expensive people, and their time is also considerably taxed by the IRB system. For example, one
rather modest research program spent 17% of its total budget dealing with its IRB.282
As a rule, disclosees bear a large share of the cost of mandated disclosure, if only because
in commercial relationships disclosers’ costs are passed on in part to disclosees. But disclosees
have direct costs of their own. Under the most optimistic view, that disclosees actually read,
interpret, and store the information, disclosees have to incur the nonmonetary cost of such acts.
2. Unintended Harms of Mandated Disclosure
Mandated disclosure has the potential to impose considerable costs in the form of
damaged individual and social interests. These are unintended costs, and they do not arise in
every setting. But there are increasing reasons to worry about their pervasiveness.
First, mandated disclosure can crowd out useful information. Because disclosers can
proffer, and disclosees can receive, only so much information, mandated disclosures effectively
keep disclosees from acquiring other information. If learning the mandated information is
actually what the disclosee most wants and need to do, this will not matter, but as we have
shown, mandates rarely if ever achieve such precision. Richard Craswell pointed out that
mandated disclosures may “reduce the attention consumer pay to other information, conceivable
leading to worse decisions rather than better ones” and give the example of brokerage fee
disclosures that cause consumer to overestimate the total cost of the loan.283
Similarly, in medicine marginally useful mandated information drives out vitally useful
unmandated information. Drug warnings are so overloaded with information that users are
279
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numbed by the quantity. This “crying wolf” dynamic is everywhere. Providers must tell patients
about advance directives (the PSDA), privacy policies (HIPAA), treatment choices (informed
consent), and safety (tort law and malpractice insurance). How much attention is left in the
patients’ reservoir (and the providers’) to learn about thing that are life- and health-saving like,
say, how to manage a chronic illness? The common estimate is that compliance rates with
treatment regimes are around 50%. Patients must be taught and persistently prompted to get the
medicine, ingest it by the right route, take the right dose at the right time, and keep taking it as
long as necessary.284 But such strenuous teaching is crowded out by disclosures.
Second, mandated disclosure can have anticompetitive effects. Disclosure costs are
substantially “fixed costs”; a substantial fraction of them does not vary with the scope of activity
or with the frequency of disclosures. These fixed costs—collecting information, drafting forms,
training employees—are roughly the same for both large and small disclosers. This gives larger
disclosers a relative advantage: their average burden of disclosure per “unit” is smaller. This, in
turn, reduces the ability of new small-size companies to enter and compete in the market.285
Such anti-competitive effects are well illustrated by disclosures vocational schools are often
required to make. In some states, they must provide statistics on as many as twenty topics,
including graduation rates, re-enrollments, exam pass rates, graduates’ job prospects, and much
more.286 Setting up a system that collects this information requires investments in bureaucracy
and record-keeping and disproportionately burdens small schools. It also requires internal
monitoring of standardization, another fixed cost that burdens the smaller competitors. These
burdens are recognized in the context of calorie labeling in food establishments. New York city’s
law applies only to chains of 15 or more restaurants.287
Third, mandated disclosure can undermine other consumer-protection regulations. For
example, the doctrine of unconscionability is an alternative protection device that allows courts
to strike oppressive terms from contracts. Contracts are unconscionable if they are substantively
intolerable and if there was some unfair procedural flaw in making the contract. Often that
procedural flaw requirement is met by a finding that an oppressive term was “hidden,” or that it
came by surprise to the consumer. If, however, disclosure of the oppressive term was performed
as mandated—if the discloser can point to a form that was handed to the consumer in a way that
complied with regulatory requirements and which the consumer received and signed—the
“hidden” element is not satisfied. That is, an empty but formally correct disclosure can keep the
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contract from being struck as unconscionable, however problematic its terms. The relief courts
might otherwise grant is undercut. As Robert Hillman noted, the disclosure can thus backfire. 288
A similar backfire effect can arise when the discloser who complies with the disclosure
mandate is freed to engage in other forms of sharp dealing. The discloser would have both a
strategic reason to counteract the chilling effect of the disclosure by giving false and biased
assurances, and the “moral” legitimacy to act in harsher ways against the adequately protected
consumer. This effect is noted in the context conflict-of-interest disclosures.289
Mandated disclosure may not only undermine other protections, it may inhibit their
development. To the extent that protections need to emerge from legislative and regulatory
effort, law-makers devising disclosure mandates would regard their mission accomplished and
escape the onerous work of devising more imaginative, more effective, and perhaps more
politically controversial alternatives.
Fourth, mandated disclosure can lead to inequity. Mandated disclosure helps most those who
need help least and helps least those who need help most. Information is more useful to welleducated and well-off people who have the resources to locate, interpret, and use the revealed
information well.290 For example, in more than one study, consumer knowledge of credit
markets was related closely to family income and education. One study found that disclosures of
a used car’s history, odometer readings, warranties, and more did not help the poor. The poor
consistently get worse terms than other buyers (for many reasons), and disclosure mandates may
have exacerbated this difference (perhaps because they are comparatively less capable of
utilizing the disclosures).291 Another context where this happens is contract boilerplate: disclosed
terms give additional value to sophisticated consumers, for which all consumers pay. For
example, Comcast included this provision in the fine print it must send customers:
“Right to Opt Out : If you do not wish to be bound by this arbitration provision,
you must notify Comcast in writing within 30 days of the date that you first
receive this agreement by visiting www.comcast.com/arbitrationoptout, or by
mail.”292
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People who opt out of mandatory arbitration may bring suits and perhaps class actions,
something only the sophisticated would know. But Comcast’s cost of exposure to such litigation
is rolled into the costs everyone pays. Likewise, advantages sophisticated credit-card users
secure (like low APRs and airline miles) are funded by the fees and high interest rates the
unsophisticated pay.293 Disclosures that help the sophisticated avoid these fees and high rates
exacerbate the cross subsidy.F
Perhaps nowhere is the inequity of mandated disclosure mFore apparent or disheartening
than in health care. “A lower education level was found in most studies [of medical patients] to
have a negative influence on comprehension and memory. Recall of information was also
negatively influenced by older age. Studies on elderly patients have shown that both
comprehension and memory performance varied directly with vocabulary level.”294
It is obvious and well-proved that there are “large health disparities between the
disadvantaged in the United States and those who are more privileged.”295 Resources spent
obeying disclosure mandates are resources that cannot be spent giving the poor what they most
need – better care. At the same time, these are resources that help the privileged more, because
literature helps the literate most.296 Here, mandated disclosure increases the disparity between
rich and poor.
Not only does mandated disclosure help the rich more than the poor; it perversely and
unintentionally obliges the poor to subsidize the rich. Good deals must be paid for. Vendors
often incorporate the cost of good deals for the sophisticated in the price everybody pays.297 We
already mentioned the redistributive effect of hospital report cards, where mandated disclosure of
“quality of care” measures disproportionately helps less sick patients and reduces the well being
of sicker ones.298
Inequity is built into the principle of mandated disclosure. The poor begin with more
troubles and fewer resources. They must pay higher interest rates than people better situated to
make the payments, deal with less reputable lenders, know less of financial affairs, are likelier to
encounter crippling financial reverses, find it harder to locate competent professional help, and
so on. They have harder decisions than the prosperous. Yet the principle of mandated disclosure
293
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is to make people responsible for decisions by giving them information. The poor, that is, have
in general harder problems that require more information and experience but have less ability to
use the information. Giving all people access to a favor that some—the “elite”—are better able to
use promotes inequity, inequity which is only aggravated if the cost of this favor is shared by the
prosperous and poor alike.

V. CONCLUSION: BEYOND MANDATED DISCLOSURE
This article has had four purposes. First, to identify a regulatory method that is much
used but has not been analyzed across doctrinal boundaries. Second, to show how widely – one
might even say indiscriminately – that method is used. Third, to demonstrate that that method is
failure-prone. Fourth, to explain why it doesn’t work and how unreliable its mechanisms are.
We might have had a fifth purpose: To prescribe a regulatory alternative. That, however,
is a large question outside the scope of the article. But the logic of our argument is that that
question cannot be answered in any straightforward way, if it can be answered at all. If mandated
disclosure has been used in a wild variety of circumstances, if the decisions mandated disclosure
is addressed to are enormously various, if the people mandated disclosure is supposed to help are
also various, it would be surprising if any single substitute for it is plausible. In what follows,
however, we warn against a few possible misunderstandings and point the way to a few useful
paths of inquiry.
A. Simple Information
We have spent much of this article describing problems people have in acquiring and
using information. As we have repeatedly said, we are not arguing that information is never
useful. Where people make a decision regularly, they become expert at making those decisions.
And sometimes very simple information is easily understood and useful. For instance, Los
Angeles County puts sanitation “grade cards” in restaurant windows, and they seem to have
influenced consumers (and led restaurants to improve their hygiene).299 This is information
anyone can understand, and the single datum is significant enough to change customers’ choice
of restaurants.
The question, obviously, is whether there is some way to boil down complicated facts to
simple ratings. The desirability of this has long been evident, and hopes for it have long been
cherished. Some mandated disclosures already use simpler rating scores. And an FTC report, for
example, suggests TILA mortgage forms can be significantly simplified and be better understood
by borrowers.300
Unfortunately, the cure for the mandated disclosure failure is not as straightforward as
merely make-them-simple. Sometimes even a simple mandate to disclose simple information
has undesirable consequences. For example, there is evidence that laws requiring that each item
299
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sold have a price on the item itself detectibly raises the price of goods sold.301 More generally,
we can identify several impediments to the success of even the simplest forms of disclosure.
First, disclosures are aimed to convey an actual element of quality: calorie count, hospital
death rate, cost of credit, or a risk feature of the product. For this to be useful, people must be
able to predict the effect of the disclosed parameter on their satisfaction. But satisfaction depends
on a host of other inputs. Moreover, people vary in their ability to use the information, and
weaker market participants—poor, uneducated, high-need individuals—must find the
information less readily useful. This was shown to be the case with respect to hospital report
cards; and it is likely to be the case with respect to the new “Country of Origin” food labeling
laws.302
Second, people are heterogeneous in their preferences and concerns, and the disclosed
parameter may matter to them in different degrees. Indeed, it is this very heterogeneity that is at
the ideological base of mandated disclosure, that makes mandated disclosure seem so necessary
to both free marketers and autonomists. Some borrowers care about APRs, others about overdraft
fees or the structure of the debt. And the transactions that are subject to mandated disclosures are
complicated and multi-dimensional. There are aspects to these transactions that might matter to
some people but not to others. Simple quality disclosures fix people’s attention on a particular
aspect, which might fail to capture the key to their satisfaction. So between the heterogeneity of
the disclosees and the complexity of the relevant information, it is normally hard to find a way of
boiling down an evaluation to a simple score.
Third, mandated disclosure will work only if law-makers do their work well. Even if
some ideal set of disclosures or some ideal summary of data can be imagined, it would need to
be identified by the law-maker and maintained by the law-maker in that form. But as we said
earlier, there is much that drives law-makers toward over-using mandated disclosure and toward
setting its standards of disclosure too broadly. In particular, an endless flow of trouble stories
induces regulatory responses. The simple, effective, disclosure is likely to be augmented over
time with additional disclosures aimed to address new problems, not resolved by the original
disclosure. For the very feature that makes some disclosures effective – their simplicity – also
keeps them from responding to the heterogeneity of problems and people. But once a simple
disclosure is bolstered and more parameters are added to it, the accumulation problem returns.
Indeed, nutrition labeling is already on this path, as more and more is added to the package (e.g.,
the food’s origin, GMO information, allergy warnings, as well as a finer breakdown of nutrients
and toxins).
While we sound a skeptical tone regarding the potential of simple mandated disclosure,
we don’t take the position that no disclosure can ever work. Failure is not inherent to any
information regime, nor is it the mandatory aspect that guarantees failure. Rather, it is the
regulatory dynamic of this institution—the desire to solve too many problems merely by
informing unsophisticated decision makers and expecting them to make affirmative thoughtful
decision—that undermines the effectiveness the system.
301
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B. From Information Toward Advice
When single data won’t do the job, when considerable information is required to make a
good decision, and when experience is required to use information well, mandated disclosure
confronts the many daunting problems we have described.
The premise of mandated disclosure is that information will help people toward the right
decisions. We have shown that the empirical history of mandated disclosure is a history of
failure. We have shown that the quantity question is generally unanswerable. The overload
problem cannot usually be solved without making disclosures fatally simple-minded, incomplete,
and misleading. The accumulation problem would defeat mandated disclosure even if individual
overload problems could be managed. We have shown that the ideological thrust of mandated
disclosure – its origins in both market and autonomy theory – is to place choice, and thus risk
and responsibility, onto the ill-informed and inexpert person facing a novel and complex
decision. We have shown that that can have especially lamentable consequences for the
vulnerable, but it also leaves the ordinary person trapped facing decisions ill-prepared and illequipped.
As we have already explained, we cannot offer a new panacea to supplant the old one.
But we can offer at least a line of hypothesis and inquiry: Mandated disclosure asks what people
should know to make a good decision. We ask what they want to know. When we abandon the
unreal world of mandated disclosure and ask how people really make decisions, we see that they
generally seek – and that the market often supplies – not data, but help, advice.
Facing important choices, people sensibly ask friends for advice. Whether seeking a
plumber, a dentist, an insurance agent, or a mortgage broker, they consult their private network
for the kind of information they trust and know how to use. Much of that information comes in
the form of recommendations, since the best way to predict one person’s satisfaction is to assess
other people’s satisfaction. The broader the network of recommendations, the sounder the
information, but the greater the challenge of aggregating recommendations into useful guidance.
Many markets have sua sponte provided such evaluations in a particularly useful form –
by aggregating recommendations from users of a good or service. Many markets depend on peer
ratings. The eBay business model relies on the willingness of buyers to pay upfront for goods
sold by anonymous sellers, a phenomenon that is largely due to the reliability of sellers’
ratings—a single score that tallies the percentage of satisfied customers. Similarly, Expedia.Com
rates hotels, Zagat rates restaurants, Cnet.Com rates electronic appliances and retailers, Amazon
rates used book sellers (and every imaginable good), and Netflix.com rates movies. Some
services try to improve scores by asking people to rate the raters, thus creating a smart weighted
ratings average. In short, innumerable market transactions and services are rated by consumers,
from blenders and pizzas to doctors and professors.
Another source of help – as opposed to just information – for consumers is to give them
expert advice. Expert advice comes in two forms. In some of the areas in which disclosures are
mandated, an expert gives personalized advice to a particular client. This happens all the time
with doctors, financial advisers, accountants, brokers, and so forth. For example, after hearing
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an insurance agent go through the mandated disclosures, many people have the agent make
(“recommend”) the decision. Next time, they skip the disclosures. Similarly, patients frequently
prefer that a doctor propose a treatment, explain it, and get their (largely symbolic) confirmation.
The problem with expert help, of course, is that it needs to be genuinely expert and
genuinely in the service of the client. These things are not easy to assure. Unfortunately,
mandated disclosure has been one of the principal means of trying to do so. Our article has
questioned whether clients are best served by a requirement that the expert provide them with
information – a solution that may tend to make the expert feel less responsible for and be less
helpful to the client.303
The second form of expert advice is advice made generally available, by purchase or
otherwise. Significant elements of the market have long sought to inform people about the views
of experts. Expert evaluations can be bought, as Consumer Report’s long history suggests, but
many are free. For example, when electing a senator, voters can consult ratings by the
Environmental Defense Fund or the NRA. When choosing a restaurant, patrons count Michelin
stars. And buying wine, many of us check Robert Parker’s wine scores.
Some very simple disclosures and many ratings systems can provide help in another way
that does not burden the consumer with data. It appears that the hygiene grade restaurants in Los
Angeles must post leads some restaurants to try to get their grades up. It seems likely that
consumer ratings can have the same effect. Our personal experience is that people selling on eBay are generally quite concerned to avoid receiving negative ratings. Insofar as disclosure
works to cause disclosers to behave better (and not merely manipulate the feedbacks and the
ratings scores), disclosees need not rely on the disclosed data but can instead (as they say) shop
with confidence.
Sometimes advice – whether the aggregated experience of the multitude or the opinions
of the expert – will not adequately help the naïve in their dealings with the sophisticated.
Another way to try to help people toward good decisions is for the law to “channel” people’s
choices, without mandating them.304 The core of channeling is not to make decisions for people
but rather to create defaults and incentives that lead them toward presumptively wise decisions,
while leaving people to reject those choices if they wish.305 For example, defaults may be set so
that people start off and can most easily stay in the position most people would prefer. This is
what intestacy statutes already do with apparent success. Because a considerable consensus
supports encouraging people to save for retirement, some employers put pension funds directly
into retirement savings account, letting employees opt out if they wish. Another channeling
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device is to require vendors to offer a basic, uniform option.306 This makes apples-to-apples
comparisons easier and improves competition. Vendors would remain free to offer more
complex choices as well.
A more aggressive way to use the law to help the naïve is to outlaw practices that are too
likely to result in disaster. Whether some choices are so likely to be so bad for so many people
that they should be outlawed is beyond the scope of this article. Recent reform in credit card
markets eliminated some choices that borrower traditionally had, which often led to poor
outcomes.307
Obviously such prohibitions close options some people would benefit from. Risky
mortgages let some people buy and keep homes who otherwise could not have done so. But at
some point the benefits of such prohibitions exceed their costs. The lawmaker’s challenge is to
identify that point. The contribution of this article is not in finding this prohibition point. The
contribution is in recognizing that such policies are sometime inevitable and cannot be
sidestepped by utilizing easier solutions based on the disclosure paradigm. If, as we have argued,
mandated disclosure rarely works, law-makers must undertake the hard work of analyzing each
social problem to find the best way to promote good decisions. In any event, the idea that
people’s autonomy is bolstered by “empowering” them to make choices through mandated
disclosures needs to be abandoned.
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